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Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attomeys for Defendants 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Payette County, Idaho 
JUN 2.s 2009 
_____ .A.M. P.M. 
BETIY J. DRESSEN 
By a~ . Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHN-
NIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
-
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
- 1 
COME NOW, the above-captioned Defendants by and through their counsel of record, 
Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and hereby submit the following requested supplemental jury 
instructions based on IDJI.2d to include supplemental instructions numbers 14, 15,23,30,31,32, 
33 and Defendants' Supplemental Requested Verdict Form. Defendants reserve the right to add, 
delete, modify or supplement this list. 
DATED this ~ day of June, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
By ~/4d;.e< 
Robert T. Wetherell, Ofthe Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-~ / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-tt, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.zs day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 





Robert T. Wetherell /' 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURy INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
- 2 17t::t'7 
( 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In this case, Defendants allege that the Employment Contracts did not have a 
lawful purpose to the extent they granted compensation to Plaintiffwithout closing on the 
transaction. 
The purpose for which the contracts were made, and the actions or non-actions 
expected of the parties in order to perform under the contracts, must all be lawful when 
the contracts were made. 
IDJI6.03.1 (modified) 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED __________ _ 
MODIFIED ------COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER ____________ _ 
1<500 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
A provision in the Employment Contracts entered into by Plaintiff and 
Defendants states: 
In the event that you, or any other broker cooperating with you, shall find 
a buyer ready, willing and able to enter into a deal for said price and 
terms, or such other terms and price as I may accept, ... I hereby agree to 
pay you in cash for your services a commission equal in amount to 5 
percent of said selling price. Should a deposit or amounts paid on account 
of purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the 
Broker, as the balance shall be paid to me. The Broker's share of any 
forfeited deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall 
not exceed the commission. 
This provision violates public policy and is unenforceable. In the state ofIdaho, a 
real estate broker does not earn compensation until the purchaser completes the 
transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the contract. 
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 257,846 P.2d 904 (1993); 
Blaine County Title Associates v. One Hundred Building Corp., Inc., 138 Idaho 517, 66 
P.3d 221 (2002). 
COlmnercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & LYlID Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 
955 (2008). 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ____ _ 
COVERED _______ __ 
OTHER --------
I<gO I 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
In this case the Defendants have asserted certain affinnative defenses. 
Defendants' affinnative defenses are as follows: 
1. Any alleged claim Plaintiff has against Defendants for breach 0 f contract 
has been waived by Plaintiff. 
2. Division of earnest monies are controlled under Idaho law by offers to 
purchase and therefore, the Employment Contracts are unenforceable in regard to 
division of earnest monies. 
3. In the offers to sell and purchase defendants entered into with 
MidAmerican, Plaintiff agreed that Defendants were entitled to all earnest monies. 
4. Plaintiff s claims are barred by estoppel. 
5. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensation without closing on the 
transaction. 
6. Plaintiff breached his fiduciary duties to Defendants. 
If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that anyone of these 
defenses has been proven, then your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
IDJI 6.10.4 (modified) 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ------
COVERED ________ __ 
OTHER --------
Iff)~ 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
Defendants / Counterclaimaints / Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. have the burden ofproving only one 
of the following propositions on their claim that Counterdefendant, Knipe Land Company 
and Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by: 
1. Failing to deliver to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc. legible 
copies of the Employment Contracts at the time Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, 
Inc's signatures were obtained. 
2. Engaging in any act or practice which was otherwise misleading, false or 
deceptive to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
3. Engaging in any unconscionable method, act or practice when providing 
real estate services to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that anyone of these 
propositions has been proven, then your verdict on the Third Party Complaint should be 
for Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Richard Robertson and Johnnie Robertson, and 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
You are to assume that Plaintiff provided services to Defendants, and that 
Defendants are consumers under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Idaho Code §§ 48-602(2) and 48-603(13), (17) and (18). 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED -------
MODIFIED _____ _ 
/ 
COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER _____________ _ 
IfD3 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2l 
As a general rule, an agent or broker who breaches fiduciary duties forfeits the 
entire compensation. 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,39 P.3d 577 (2001) 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED _____ _ 
COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER __________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 31. .. 
Every contract contains a duty of reasonable performance. The covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing requires Third-Party Defendant John Knipe to perform in good faith 
the obligations contained in the parties' agreements. 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 
955 (2008). 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MODIFIED ______ _ 
COVERED _________ _ 
OTHER~ __________ _ 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 --
If Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant John Knipe's act which proximately caused injury to the 
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs were an extreme deviation from reasonable standards 
of conduct and that these acts were malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or outrageous, you 
may, in addition to any compensatory damages to which you find the Defendants/Third-
Party Plaintiffs entitled, award to Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs an amount which will 
punish the Plaintiff/Third-Party Defendant John Knipe and deter him and others from 
engaging in similar conduct in the future. 
IDJI 9.20 (Alternate) 
GIVEN ____________ _ 
REFUSED ________ __ 
MOD IF IED ________ _ 
COVERED __________ _ 
OTHER. ____________ _ 
liOb 
DEFENDANTS' I THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' 
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED VERDICT FORM 
QUESTION NO.1: Did a valid contract exist between Plaintiff and Defendants? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 1: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question 
"yes," then continue to the next question. 
QUESTION NO.2: Did Defendants breach the contract? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 2: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question 
"yes," then continue to the next question. 
QUESTION NO.3: Has Plaintiffbeen damaged on account of the breach? 
ANSWER TO OUESTION 3: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question 
"yes," then continue to the next question. 
QUESTION NO.4: Did the Defendants prove anyone of their affirmative defenses? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.4: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "no," then continue to the next question. If you answered 
this questions "yes," then go to Question 6. 
QUESTION NO.5: What are Plaintiff's damages? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.5: Amount: $ ________ _ 
QUESTION NO.6: Did Third-Party Defendant, John Knipe, violate the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act with respect to Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Richard and Johlmie 
Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc.? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.6: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "yes," then continue to the next question. If you answered 
this questions "no," then go to Question 8. 
/~(J'7 
QUESTION NO.7: What are Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Richard and Johnnie 
Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc.' s damages? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.7: Amount: $ _______ _ 
QUESTION NO.8: Did the Third-Party Defendant, John Knipe, take and convert 
$22,500.00 belonging to Defendants / Third-party Plaintiffs Richard and Johnnie 
Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. for his own use? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 8: YES [ ] NO [ ] 
If you answered this question "yes," then continue to the next question, if you answered 
"no," you are done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. 
QUESTION NO.9: What are Defendants / Third-Party Plaintiffs' damages? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION NO.9: Amount: $ __________ _ 
(Please see the next page.) 
You are now done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. 
Dated this ___ day of June, 2009. 
FOREMAN 
IfO~ 
Robel1 T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attomeys for Defendants 
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DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 




The COUli should enter a directed verdict for the Defendants and grant their renewed motion 
for summary judgment. As set forth below, the employment agreements are unenforceable as a 
matter law. Specifically, these agreements do not contain the mandated legal descriptions as are 
required under Idaho licensing statutes. Additionally, Defendants are entitled to a directed verdict 
and judgment because the underlying real estate transaction never closed. Finally, the Court should 
grant the instant motions as the term "forfeiture" has a settled legal meaning, requiring a breach of 
contract before the provision can apply. 
As a result, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for a directed verdict and renewed 
motion for summary judgment. 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The applicable mle regarding motions for a directed verdict states as follows: 
Motion for directed verdict - When made - Effect. 
A paIiy who moves for a directed verdict at the close ofthe evidence 
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the 
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and 
to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for 
directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury 
even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. 
A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds 
therefor. The order of the COllli granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
See I.R.C.P. 50(a). 
With respect to the renewed motion for summary judgment, the standards for summary 
judgment as contained in Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Specifically, 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-2 
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summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LR.C.P. 56( c). Fm1her, the non-
moving must not rest upon mere allegations or demands, but must set f011h specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Doev.Durtschi, 110Idah0466,469, 716P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986). 
Additionally, the non-moving party must come forward and produce evidence to contradict 




A. The Employment Agreements are Unenforceable as a Matter of Law. 
The employment agreements do not meet the statutory requirements for brokerage 
representation agreements under Idaho law. It is well established that real estate contracts are unique 
in that they are heavily regulated by statute. See I.C § 54-2001, et. seq. As such, a valid broker's 
representation agreement requires: 
(a) Conspicuous and definite begim1ing and expiration dates; (b) a 
legally enforceable description of the property; (c) price m1d tenl1s; 
(d) all fees and commissions; and (e) the signature of the owner ofthe 
real estate or the owner's legal, appointed and duly qualified 
representative, and the date of such signature. 
See I.C § 54-2050. 
Significantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that this licensing statute applies to 
private causes of action. See e.g., Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038 
(2003). 
In Garner, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a property address, stated "4565 Nounan Road, 
County Bear Lake, City Nounan, Zip 83254" was not a "legally enforceable description of the 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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property as required under Idaho Code § 54-2050(1)(b)." Id. at 436,80 P.3d at 1037. Additionally, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that this property description did not meet the requirements of the 
statute of frauds under Idaho Code § 9-503. Id. The parties in Garner apparently understood what 
property was being sold. Id. at 436,80 P.3d at 1037. Nevertheless, the pl'operty description in the 
representation agreement contained only the home address and the approximate acreage being sold. 
Id. 
The Garner case is important in that it shows a representation agreement must meet the strict 
requirements for an enforceable description ofthe propeliy. Fmiher, the need for a specific propeliy 
description has recently been emphasized by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Ray v. Frazier, 
146 Idaho 625,630,200 P.3d 1174, 1179 (2009) (holding that a physical address is a not a sufficient 
description of the property for purposes ofthe statute of frauds). 
In this matter, the employment contracts between Plaintiff and Defendants reference an 
exhibit allegedly containing a legally enforceable property description. Neveliheless, this "exhibit 
A" was not attached to the employment contracts at the time of execution. 
As a matter oflaw, therefore, the employment contacts in this case are not valid as they lack 
the statutory requirements as set forth in Idaho Code § 54-2050(1)(b) and Idaho Code § 9-503. 
B. Defendants are Entitled to a Directed Verdict and Judgment as a Broker Cannot 
Recover Compensation Unless the Underlying Transaction Closes. 
Plaintiffis not entitled to compensation in this matter as the underlying real estate transaction 
never closed. It is well established that Idaho courts have adopted the rule as set f01ih in Ellsworth 
DoM, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843,855 (N.J. 1967). See Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. 
And Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 213, 177 P.3d 955, 960 (2008); Blaine County Title 
Associates v. One Hundred Building Corp., Inc., 138 Idaho 517, 521, 66 P .3d 221, 225 (2002); 
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Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 257,846 P.2d 904, 908 (1993); see also Strout 
Realty, Inc. v. Milhous, 107 Idaho 330, 334, 689 P.2d 222, 226 (Ct. App. 1984). 
This rule requires that compensation only be paid where "the purchaser completes the 
transaction by closing the title." Margaret H. Wayne Trust, 123 Idaho at 260, 846 P.2d at 911. 
Further, the foregoing cases are significant as they show that parties cannot contract around the 
requirement that brokers must close on a transaction before receiving compensation. 
As the Idaho Supreme COUli recently explained: 
Now, in addition to procuring a ready, willing and able buyer, the 
buyer must enter into a binding contract with the owner and the buyer 
must complete the transaction by closing title .... 
Commercial Ventures, Inc., 145 Idaho at 213, 177 P.3d at 960 (citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust, 
123 Idaho at 260, 846 P.2d at 911). 
The facts in the case of Margaret H. Wayne Trust, are stIikingly similar to the facts in the 
instant matter, thus creating a sufficient basis for a directed verdict and judgment for Defendants. 
In Margaret H. Wayne Trust, the seller, Ms. Wayne, and the purchaser, Mr. Lipsky, entered into a 
real estate purchase and sale agreement. A real estate broker, Mr. Reynolds, subsequently showed 
the propeliy to Mr. Lipsky. See id. 145 Idaho at 257, 846 P.2d at 908. The sale of the property, 
however, was never closed. See id. at 255,846 P.2d at 906. Significantly, the agreement between 
the paIiies contained a clause regarding the forfeiture of nonrefundable money. The agreement stated 
in pertinent part: 
If ... buyer neglects or refuses to comply with the terms or any 
conditions of sale within five days from the date on which said ten11 
or condition is to be complied with, then the earnest money shall be 
f07feited and considered as liquidated damages to seller, aI1d buyer's 
interest in the premises shall be immediately ten11inated. The broker 
shall pay fi-om said earnest money the cost of title insurance, escrow 
fees, attorneys' fees and any other expenses directly inculTed in 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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connection with this transaction, and the remainder shall be appor-
tioned one-halfto the seller and one-half to the broker, provided the 
amount to broker does not exceed the commission. 
Id. at 257,846 P.2d at 908 (emphasis added). 
During a bench trial, the trial court granted payment for compensation owed to the broker, 
Mr. Reynolds. In reversing the trial court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized: 
Idaho has, in the past, adopted the traditional mle that a broker eams 
his commission when he procures a buyer who is ready, willing and 
able to purchase on terms acceptable to the seller. .. A growing 
number of courts have, however, added a requirement that there must 
be a closing oftitle for the broker to receive a commission, adopting 
the rationale of Elsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 
A.2d 843 (1967): when a broker is engaged by any owner of property 
to find a purchaser for it, the broker eams his commission when ... 
( c) the purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in 
accordance with the provisions ofthe contract. 
Id. at 259-60,846 P.2d 910-11 (emphasis added). 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that because "the transaction between Lipsky and 
Wayne never closed, Reynolds did not eam his commission." See id. at 260,846 P.2d at 911. The 
COllli further held that as Wayne was a "non-breaching paIiy," she was not liable for any commission 
to the broker, Mr. Reynolds. Id. Explicit in this decision is that the buyer and seller were not liable 
for aIly compensation to the broker until the transaction closed. 
Similarly, the parties in the case at bar have entered into an agreement regarding the broker's 
compensation, which states in peliinent part: 
Should a depositor amounts paid on account of purchase be forfeited, 
one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the broker, as the balance 
shall be paid to me. The broker's share of any forfeited deposit or 
amounts paid on account of purchase, shall not exceed the commis-
SIOn. 
See Defendants' Exhibits "A" and "B". 
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Thus, the contract provisions in the Margaret Wayne Trust case and the instant matter are 
essentially the same. Both contracts contain forfeiture provisions regarding deposited monies and 
a provision for distribution to the broker. Nevertheless, as the broker in Margaret Wayne Trust did 
not receive any compensation, likewise Plaintiff in this matter cannot receive compensation as the 
transaction did not close. See Margaret Wayne Trust, 145 Idaho at 260, 846 P.2d at 911. 
C. The Court Should Grant the Instant Motions as the Term "Forfeiture"Has a 
Settled Legal Meaning. 
The tenn "forfeited" is defined as a matter oflaw and requires a breach by the buyer in order 
for it to become applicable. As set forth in another Idaho district comi case, Sauls v. Luchi, CV 
2004-1616 (Dis. Ct. First Judicial Dist, Idaho June 17,2005): 
The primary purposes of eal11est money is to ensure that the seller 
will recover damages ifthe buyer defaults .... In the present case, the 
buyer did not breach the contract, so even if the forfeiture clause is 
valid regarding the eal11est money deposit, it is not applicable. 
Thus, in Idaho there can be nor forfeiture of eal11est money unless the buyer first breaches 
the purchase and sale agreement. 
COUlis from other jurisdictions similarly have defined "forfeiture" as requiring a breach of 
contract or neglect of duty. See People v. Blair, 831 N.E.2d 604, 615 (Ill. 2005)( defining forfeiture 
as the loss of a privilege or property because of crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty); 
Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation v. Grayson, 746 So.2d 121, 123-24 (La. App. 3rd 
1999)( defining forfeiture as a surrender of something as a punishment for a crime, offense, enor, or 
breach of contract); Baldwin v. Cook, 23 S.W.2d 601,604 (Ky. I 930)(stating that the word forfeit 
has a well-established meaning, which is "to divest or to suffer divestiture of propeliy without 
compensation in consequence of a default or offense"). Hence, a deposit or amount held in trust is 
only "forfeited" upon a breach by the potential buyer. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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In this matter, there is no allegation by Plaintiff that the Harn10ns or MidAmerica committed 




Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for directed verdict 
and renewed motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this~ayofJune, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & C 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~y of June, 2009, I served a tme and correct copy 
of the foregoing upon each of the followmg mdividuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
It(8 
CASE NO. CV-2008-6 
FINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS' 
INSTRUCTION NO. q 
If during the trial I said or did anything which suggests to you that I am inclined to favor 
the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such 
suggestion. I did not express nor intend to express, nor did I intend to intimate, any opinion as to 
which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not established; or what 
inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seemed to indicate an 
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
I~II 
INSTRUCTION NO (0 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is 
respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. _( ,_ 
The terms ofthe contract are in dispute as to the following provisions: 
Should a deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase be 
forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the broker, and the 
balance shall be paid to me. The broker's share of any forfeited deposit or 
amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the 
commission. 
You must determine what was intended by the parties as evidenced by the contract in this case. In 
making this determination you should consider, from the evidence, the following: 
1. The contract must be construed as a whole, including all of the circumstances giving 
rise to it, to give consistent meaning to every part of it. 
2. Language must be given its ordinary meaning, unless you find from the evidence 
that a special meaning was intended. 
3. Any communications, conduct or dealings between the contracting parties showing 
what they intended and how they construed the doubtful language may be considered, provided that 
such may not completely change the agreement or construe one term inconsistently with the 
remainder of the terms. 
4. The contract should be construed to avoid any contradiction or absurdities. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
t8J-1 
INSTRUCTION NO. i 2-
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract offered by any 
witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before execution of the written agreement, 
which is inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. While you may 
consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarifY an ambiguity, you may not consider such 
testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a 
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or parts. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. J~ 
Where there is ambiguous language in a contract, and where the true intent of the parties 
cannot be ascertained by any other evidence, the ambiguity can be resolved by interpreting the 
contract against the party who drafted the contract or provided the ambiguous language. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. I 3 A 
If the language used by the parties to a contract is plain, complete, and unambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone, no 
matter what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may have been. The intent of the parties 
to a contract is expressed by the natural and ordinary meaning of their language and the parties 
are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. t'8 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants; 
2. The Defendants breached the contract; 
3. The Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions required 
of the Plaintiff has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised 
by the Defendants, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, your verdict should 
be for the Defendants. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. Ito 
The Defendants have raised the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel. This is a legal 
term which means that a party is deemed to have waived a claimed breach of contract by reason of 
the party's own conduct. To establish the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel, the Defendants 
have the burden of proof on each ofthe following propositions: 
1. The Plaintiff represented to the Defendants by words or conduct, or by silence when 
a duty to speak and protest the action of the Defendants existed, that Plaintiff was waiving, 
excusing, or forgiving those Defendants' breach of contract; and 
2. The Defendants relied upon this representation and materially changed position in 
reliance thereon; and 
3. The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and 
4. The change of position was to the Defendants' detriment. 
If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that the 
Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiff for the claimed breach of contract. If the Defendants fail to 
prove all of the propositions, they have not established the affirmative defense of estoppel. 
JUR Y INSTRUCTIONS /i~7 
INSTRUCTION NO. t 1 
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct, 
by words, or by acquiescence. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. { ~ 
In their claim for conversion of money, Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson 
Kennels, Inc. have the burden of proving each of the following propositions against John Knipe: 
1. That John Knipe kept $22,500 without a right to do so; 
2. The nature and extent of the damages to Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson 
Kennels, Inc., and the amount thereof 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions ahs 
been proved, then your verdict on this issue should be for the Robertsons and Robertsons Kennels, 
Inc.; but, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions have 
not been proved, then your verdict on this issue should be for Mr. Knipe. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. fl 
The Plaintiff has raised the affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel against the 
Defendants' counterclaim. This is a legal term which means that a party is deemed to have waived 
a claimed breach of contract by reason of the party's own conduct. To establish the affirmative 
defense of waiver by estoppel, the Counter-Defendants have the burden of proof on each of the 
following propositions: 
1. The Defendants represented to Knipe Land Company and/or John Knipe by words 
or conduct, or by silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of Knipe Land Company 
and/or John Knipe existed, that Defendants were waiving, excusing, or forgiving those Counter-
Defendants' breach of contract; and 
2. The Counter-Defendants relied upon this representation and materially changed 
position in reliance thereon; and 
3. The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances; and 
4. The change of position was to the Counter-Defendants' detriment. 
If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you should find that the 
Counter-Defendants are not liable to the Defendants on their counterclaim. If the Counter-
Defendants fail to prove all of the propositions, they have not established the affirmative defense of 
estoppel. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1f:J 
Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. have the additional burden 
of proving the following propositions on their claim that Knipe Land Company and John Knipe 
violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by: 
1. Failing to deliver to Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc. legible copies of the 
Employment Contracts at the time Robertsons and Robertson Kennels, Inc.' s 
signatures were obtained; and/or 
2. Engaging in any act or practice which was otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive 
to Robertsons and/or Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
Richard and Johnnie Robertson and Robertson Kennels, Inc. also have the burden of 
proving that as a result of the violation they were damaged, and the amount therof. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ;83/ 
INSTRUCTION NO.zL 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for your 
deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the attitude 
and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of 
pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is 
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, 
there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you 
must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~1, 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide 
any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are 
to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to 
average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of 
the damage award ~' ;..pm~~~~~~~rce:r 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS /8B3 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? ~ 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. Please use this process with restraint. As I previously 
instructed you, the Court is unable to coach you as to the value or effect of the evidence or to the 
weight you should attach to it. That is the duty of the jury alone. In addition, you are not to 
reveal to me or anyone else how the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you 
are instructed by me to do so. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION No.l~ 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside over 
your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict form, and answer all ofthe questions required of you by the instructions on 
the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as nine 
or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill 
it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on each question. 
If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the 
entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who will 
then return you into open court. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS /835 
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KNIPE LAND COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
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vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and 















RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ) 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ) 
ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 




JOHN KNIPE, an individual, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant. ) 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
CASE NO. CV-2008-682 
VERDICT 
QUESTION 1: Did the Defendants breach the Employment Contracts they entered into 
with Plaintiff? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 1: YesW NoLL 
VERDICT 
If you answered this question "No," then go to Question 4. If you answered this question 
"Yes," continue to the next question. 
QUESTION 2: Did the Defendants prove any of their affirmative defenses? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 2: Yes~ No~ 
If you answered this question "No," then continue to the next question. If you answered 
this question "Yes," then go to Question 4. 
QUESTION 3: What are Plaintiff's damages? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 3: Amount 
QUESTION 4: Did John Knipe convert $22,500 belonging to the Robertsons and 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. for his own use? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 4: No~] 
If you answered this question "no," then go to Question 6. If you answered this question 
"Yes," continue to the next question. 
QUESTION. 5: What are the damages ofMr. and Mrs. Robertson and Robertson 
Kennels, Inc. with respect to this claim? 
Amount $ -------
QUESTION 6. Did John Knipe violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act? 
ANSWER TO QUESTION 6: YesLL.QJ NoLL] 
If you answered this question "no," you are done. Sign the Verdict as instructed and 
advise the bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question. 
VERDICT 
QUESTION 7: What are the damages ofMr. and Mrs. Robertson and Robertson Kennels, 
Inc. with respect to this claim? 
Amount $ I 000 
I 
















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
********** 
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
COURT REPORTER: DENECE GRAHAM 
DATE: June 25, 2009 
Knipe Land Company, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson, and 
Robertson Kennels Inc., 
Defendant. 
Richard A. Robertson and 
Johnnie L. Robertson, and 
Robertson Kennels Inc., 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
John Knipe, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2008-00682*D 
COURT MINUTES 
Time:8:29 A.M.- 6:43 P.M. 
Courtroom #1 
This being the time and place set for third day of jury 
trial, present before the Honorable Stephen W. Drescher were 
John Knipe; plaintiff and third party defendant, Mark Geston 
and Jennifer Rhinehart on behalf of the plaintiff, Richard 
Robertson; defendant and third party plaintiff, Robert 
Wetherell and Derek Pica on behalf of the defendant. 
The parties were present outside the presence of the jury. 
Mr. Wetherell presented an offer of proof as to using a 
dictionary. Mr. Geston made an objection to the defendant's 
motion. The Court ordered the objection was sustained. Mr. 
Wetherell made further statements. 
The jurors were present and appropriately seated in the 
courtroom at 8:36 a.m. 
Court Minutes June 25, 2009 
John Knipe was reminded of his oath and returned to the 
wi tness stand. Mr. Wetherell continued with cross 
examination of the witness. 
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court sustained the 
objection. Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court sustained 
the objection. Mr. Geston made another objection, the Court 
sustained the objection. 
Mr. Geston presented redirect examination of the witness. 
Mr. Wetherell made an objection based on leading, the Court 
sustained the objection. 
The witness was excused at 8:54 a.m. 
Mr. Geston offered Plaintiff exhibit 43; defendant Richard 
and Johnnie Robertson's 2007 Tax Returns. Mr. Wetherell made 
an objection based on lack of foundation. The Court 
sustained the objection. 
The plaintiff rested. 
Mr. Wetherell advised he had a motion to argue outside the 
presence of the jury. The Court ordered to reserve the 
argument and call the defendant's first witness. 
Mr. Wetherell called Richard Robertson; the defendant, who 
was duly sworn by the clerk and testified under direct 
examination of Mr. Wetherell. 
Mr. Wetherell presented previously marked Defendant exhibit 
0; Harmon extension agreement dated February 15, 2006, and 
moved for admission. Mr. Geston had no objection. THE COURT 
ORDERED DEFENDANT EXHIBIT 0 WAS ADMITTED. 
Mr. Wetherell presented previously marked Defendant exhibit 
N; Rowena Strain facsimile stating Richard will extend 
closing with non-refundable earnest money, and moved for 
admission. Mr. Geston had no obj ection. THE COURT ORDERED 
DEFENDANT EXHIBIT N WAS ADMITTED. 
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court sustained the 
objection. Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court overruled 
the obj ection. Mr. Geston made an obj ection, the Court 
overruled the obj ection. Mr. Geston made an objection, the 
Court Minutes June 25, 2009 
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Court sustained the objection. Mr. Geston made an objection, 
the Court overruled the objection. Mr. Geston made an 
obj ection and presented argument, the Court admonished Mr. 
Wetherell to not coach the witness. 
Mr. Wetherell continued with direct examination of the 
witness. 
Mr. Geston made an obj ection based on relevance, the Court 
overruled the objection. 
The jurors were reminded of their admonishment and the Court 
recessed at 9:38 a.m. 
The Court reconvened at 9:55 a.m. outside the presence of the 
jury. 
Mr. Wetherell presented motion for directed verdict and 
renewed his motion for summary judgment. The Court made 
explanation to the parties and denied the motion. 
Mr. Wetherell made inquiry to the Court regarding the Idaho 
Consumer Protective Act. Mr. Geston responded. The Court 
addressed counsel. Mr. Wetherell made further argument. 
The Court noted for the record that prior to trial beginning 
counsel stipulated to not have alternate jurors. 
Mr. Geston presented argument regarding motion in limine 
regarding testimony of Cindy Crain. Mr. Wetherell presented 
an offer of proof to the Court. The Court made inquiry to 
Mr. Wetherell. Mr. Wetherell responded. Mr. Geston replied. 
The Court ordered the witness can testify but admonished 
counsel as to her limited testimony. 
The Court recessed at 10:14 a.m. 
The Court recovened at 10:21 a.m., with counsel present and 
the jurors were present and appropriately seated. 
Richard Robertson was reminded of his oath and returned to 





made an objection, the Court sustained the 
Mr. Wetherell made an objection, the Court 
obj ection. Mr. Wetherell made an obj ection 
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based on relevance, the Court overruled the objection. Mr. 
Pica made an objection, Mr. Geston responded, the Court 
overruled the objection. 
Mr. Geston presented previously marked Plaintiff exhibit 43; 
defendants Richard and Johnnie Robertson's 2007 tax returns, 
and moved to admit page one of the exhibit. Mr. Wetherell 
had a question in lieu of an objection, and objected to the 
admission. The Court overruled the objection. 
Mr. Geston had the witness refer to page 11 of exhibit 43. 
THE COURT ORDERED PAGE 11 OF PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT 43 WAS 
ADMITTED. 
Mr. Wetherell conducted redirect examination of the witness. 
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court allowed the question. 
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court sustained the 
objection. 
Mr. Geston conducted re-cross examination of the witness. 
Mr. Wetherell made an objection, Mr. Geston responded, and 
the Court overruled the objection and advised the witness can 
speak for himself. 
The witness was excused at 11:05 a.m. 
Mr. Wetherell called Cindy Crane; representative of 
MidAmerican, who was duly sworn by the clerk and testified 
under direct examination of Mr. Wetherell. 
Mr. Geston made an objection, 
objection. 
the Court sustained the 
Mr. Geston conducted cross examination of the witness. Mr. 
Geston moved to strike the evidence of the witness, the Court 
overruled the objection. 
Mr. Wetherell conducted redirect examination of the witness. 
Mr. Geston made an objection based on beyond the scope, the 
Court sustained the objection. Mr. Geston made another 
objection, the Court overruled the objection. 
The witness was excused at 11:25 a.m. 
Court Minutes June 25, 2009 
The defense rested. 
The State had no rebuttal evidence. 
The Court reminded the jurors of their admonishment and 
recessed at 11:27 a.m. 
The Court reconvened at 1:33 p.m. with counsel present 
without the jurors. 
In answer to the Court's 
argument for his obj ection 
Wetherell responded. 
inquiry, Mr. Geston presented 
to the jury instructions. Mr. 
The Court noted the plaintiff's objections to the 
instructions. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Wetherell presented 
argument in favor of the jury instructions. The Court denied 
the request to instruct the jury on punitive damages. 
The Court amended the jury instructions and advised jury 
instruction 13A would be included. 
Mr. Wetherell moved to amend the complaint and presented 
argument. Mr. Geston made an objection. The Court sustained 
the objection. 
Mr. Geston made a motion regarding directed verdict. The 
Court denied the plaintiff's motion. 
Mr. Wetherell inquired about procedure of closing argument. 
The Court responded. 
The Court recessed at 2:08 p.m. 
The Court reconvened at 2:22 p.m. with counsel and jurors 
present and appropriately seated. 
The Court gave the jury instructions to the jury panel. 
Mr. Geston presented closing argument. 
Mr. Wetherell presented closing argument. 
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Geston made another objection with the same basis, the Court 
sustained the obj ection. Mr. Geston made an obj ection, and 
the Court admonished the jury to remember the facts of the 
case as presented during trial not the closing argument. Mr. 
Geston made an objection, the Court sustained the objection. 
Mr. Geston made an objection, the Court allowed Mr. Wetherell 
to continue. 
Mr. Geston presented rebuttal closing argument. 
The clerk swore in the bailiff. 
The jury was excused to the jury room for deliberation at 
4:08 p.m. 
The Court thanked counsel and recessed at 4:11 p.m. 
The Court reconvened at 6:36 p.m. 
and the jurors were present 
appropriately seated. 
all parties were present 
in the courtroom and 
In answer to the Court's inquiry the jurors indicated a 
verdict had been reached. 
Juror 587 presented the verdict form to the Court. 
The Court reviewed the verdict form and advised it 
order, the clerk read the verdict form. The 
concurred that the verdict was correct. 
Mr. Wetherell waived polling the jury panel. 
was in 
foreman 
Mr. Geston requested the jurors be polled by the Court. 
The Court made inquiry of each juror as to the verdict 
reached. Juror 3, 590, 592, 596, 542, 484, 13, 574, 506, 
564, 587, and 571 concurred that the verdict was correct. 
The Court read the final jury instruction to the jury panel, 
thanked them for their service, and excused the jurors at 
6:43 p.m. 
The Court asked Mr. Wetherell to prepare the appropriate 
judgment. 
Court was adjourned. 
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RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third P Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT 
JURORS 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS - 1 
BOise·2217S9.10010908-0oo08 I B '1 b 
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COME NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe, by 
and through their counsel of record, and hereby submit notice of their intent to contact the 
individual jUtors impaneled during the trial held June 23, 2009 through June 25,2009, in Payette 
County, Idaho in the instant matter. 
Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant request immediate notification by counsel for 
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs of any objection to this intention to contact said jurors. 
DATED: JWle~O, 2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Mark S. Gestol1 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS - 2 
6()isc-1211S9.1 0010908-00008 I Y 4' 7 
06/30/2009 10:03 FAX 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on June 'g" ,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO CONTACT JURORS on the following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capito! Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekplca@mS12.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
Robert T. Wetherell 
[ ] Via U.s. Mail 
[~ia Fac~imi1e 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[~ia Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] ViaEmail 
P. O. Box 1009 
Boise, ID 83701-1009 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Email: rlw@brassey.net 
Attorneys for Defendants 
~kS. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Mark S, Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
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RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN ~NIPE, an individual, 
Third P Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
PLAINTIFF I THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' / THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF 
JUDGMENT 
PLAINTIFF / TIDRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' I 




COME NOW PlaintiffI<nipe Land Company' and Third Party Defendant John Knipe, by 
and through their counsel of record and hereby object to the proposed form of Judgment 
submitted by Defendants / Thlrd Party Plaintiffs on June 30, 2009. 
The proposed form of Judgment is needlessly prolix, contains irrelevancies, and 
improperly attempts to crea.te new claims fOt relief by Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs. 
Specifically, the proposed form of Judgment recites the pleadings in its numbered 
paragraphs 1,2 and 3, in violation of Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 54(a). 
Secondly, the proposed fonn of Judament purportedly reserves "additional claims [by 
Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs] under the equitable powers of the Court pursuant to 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act." There is no justification for the inclusion of such a provision 
in the Judgment that the Court will enter in light of the jury's verdict. All of the claims 
Defendants / Third Party Plaintiffs sought to bring under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
have been fully litigated and the jury has conclusively determined that their sole relief they are 
entitled to thereunder should be a verdict of$l,OOO against Third Party Defendant, John Knipe. 
There are no "additional" claims left for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs to assert in 
this case. Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs moved to amend their pleadings to conform to 
the evidence after the parties bad rested at trial but that motion was denied by the Court. 
This controversy has been fully resolved by the JUl")"S verdict. . There is therefore no 
reason for any mention of a prospective declaration of fInality under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b). 
PLAINTIFF I THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' I 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT - 2 
Boise-221860.20010908-OO009 If60 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY on July C, ,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF I 
mIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS I THIRD PARTY 
PLAlNTlFFSt PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT on the following, in the matter 
indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise,l.D 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email;derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
Robert T. Wetherell 
[ ] Via U .8. Mail 
[t..:y\'ia Facsimile 
[ ] Via OVernight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail . 
[t..{"Via Facsimile 
[ J Via Overnight Mail 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
P. O. Box 1009 
Boise,ID 83701-1009 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Email: rtw@brassey.net 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Mark S, Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT -1 







This matter having come on regularly for jury trial and the jury having rendered its verdict 
in this cause, 
JUDGMENT is hereby entered upon the jury verdict as follows: 
1. PlaintiffKNlPE LAND COMPANY'S Complaint in this matter is dismissed, with 
prejudice and Plaintiff KNIPE LAND COMPANY shall take nothing by way of its 
Complaint. 
2. Third-Party Plaintiffs RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. ROBERT-
SON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
complaint for conversion against JOHN KNIPE, an individual, is dismissed, with 
prejudice and Third Party Plaintiffs RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation shall take nothing by way of their Complaint for conversion against 
Third Party Defendant JOHN KNIPE, an individual. 
3. Third Party Plaintiffs RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIEL. ROBERTSON, 
husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation 
complaint against Third Party Defendant JOHN KNlPE, an individual, for violation 
ofthe Idaho Consumer Protection Act is GRANTED and JUDGMENT for $1 ,000.00 
is hereby entered in favor of RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation and against Third Party Defendant, JOHN KNIPE, an individual. 
The Court took under advisement, until such time as nominal damages were awarded by the 
Jury under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, additional claims under the equitable powers ofthis 
Court pursuant to Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. 
JUDGMENT -2 I fs4 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that any additional claims forre1ief 
under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, made by RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNNIE L. 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, shall 
be filed with this Court within 14 days of the entry by the Clerk of this Order. 
By way of this JUDGMENT, the Court specifically retains jurisdiction over the equitable 
remedies, if any, which may be requested by RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and JOHNN1E L. 
ROBERTSON, husband and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
pursuant to Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.C. 48-6501 et seq. 
This JUDGMENT is specifically entered pursuant to lRCP 54(b) and no 54(b) Certificate is 
entered and no party may consider this JUDGMENT as a FINAL JUDGMENT until a Rule 54(b) 
Certified Judgment is e,~.I.JVU­
DATED this 
HONORABLE STEPHEN W. DRESCHER 
JUDGMENT -3 1855 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
:rttL 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J-I;:;. day of furre;'2009, I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Robert T. Wetherell 
Brassey, Wetherell, & Crawford 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
JUDGMENT -4 
Clerk 









Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JUL 1 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
DEFENDANTSITIIIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 1 
COME NOW, DefendantslThird-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") by and through 
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and respectfully move the Court for an 
Order awarding costs and attorneys fees incurred in this matter. This motion is brought pursuant to 
Idaho statute, including, but not limited to, I.e. §§ 12-120(3),48-608(5), and 12-121, as well as Rule 
54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This motion is supported by Defendants' Memorandum In Support and the Affidavits of 
Robert T. Wetherell and Derek Pica, filed contemporaneously herewith, and is further supported by 
the papers and pleadings of record. 
Defendants reserve the right to supplement this motion with a request for additional costs and 
attorneys fees pending the resolution of the post-trial motions and activities in this matter. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this ~ay of July, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
DEFENDANTS/THIRD-P ARTY PLAlNTlFFS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;t5day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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ORIGINAL 
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT T. 
WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS/THIRD-P ARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 1 I H ~ 0 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
ROBERT T. WETHERELL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That your Affiant is over the age of 21, and is competent to make this Affidavit and 
does so based upon his own direct and personal knowledge. 
2. That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") and offers the following testimony based upon his knowledge 
and upon the accounts, records and ledgers kept by your Affiant's law fum in the ordinary course 
of business. Further, this Affidavit is made pursuant to Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
3. That the costs and fees are claimed in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, that your Affiant believes an award of costs and attorneys fees to 
the Defendants is proper and appropriate in this case on the grounds and for the reasons that 
Defendants are the prevailing party in this action pursuant to I.e. §§ 12-120(3),48-608(5), 12-121 
and Rule 54( d) and (e). Specifically, Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiff s claims for 
$220,000, and prevailed upon Defendants' own claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
4. That to the best of your Affiant's knowledge and belief, all the costs, disbursements 
and attorneys fees listed below and in any way associated with Defendants' Motion for Costs and 
Attorneys Fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred in litigating this matter in good faith, and 
that none ofthe costs and attorneys fees were incurred to vex, harass or annoy Plaintiff. Further, the 
costs and attorneys' fees were not incurred for the pUrposes of increasing the Plaintiff s costs and 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES - 2 I~ ~ I 
attorneys fees in this matter. The costs and attorneys' fees set out below are true and accurate, and 
are presented to the Court in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of your Affiant's finn's 
statement of account for this matter, as created in the normal and ordinary course of business. This 
statement reflects the legal services and costs perfonned or incurred by our firm on behalf of 
Defendants. 
6. The following is a summary ofthe costs and attorneys fees incurred by our finn on 
behalf of Defendants: 
A. COSTS ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) 
• Filing fees: (See Affidavit of Derek Pica) 
• Costs of exhibits: [as a matter of right, capped at $500, remainder is 
discretionary] 
-6/21109: Copying of exhibits 657 @ 0.15 = $98.55 
-6/22/09: Easel and pad $31.79 
-6/22/09: Copying of exhibits 570 @ 0.15 = $85.50 
-6/22/09: Copying 12 sets of221 jury exhibits 2652 @ 0.15 = $397.80 
• Deposition transcripts and/or copies: (See Affidavit of Derek Pica) 
Total Costs as a Matter of Right (by fmn on behalf of Defendants): $500.00 
B. DISCRETIONARY COSTS ALLOWED UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) 
• Cost of exhibits (residual amount): $113.64 
Round-trip Travel to Payette for trial: 
-3 days (June 23,24, and 25,2009) for Robert Wetherell 
165 x 3 = 495 miles @0.50 = $247.50 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT T. WETHERELL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTSITHIRD-P ARTY PLAINTIFFS' 
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-6-24-09 for Brad Richardson 120 @0.55 = $66.00 
-6-25-09 for Brad Richardson 105 @0.55 = $57.75 
• Additional Travel expenses: meals during trial as submitted by 
Robert Wetherell = $128.90 
Total discretionary costs claimed: $613.79 
C. ATTORNEY FEES 
Attorneys fees incurred by my firm on behalfofDefendants amount to $35,915.00. 
TOTAL COSTS & FEES CLAIMED: $ 37,038.54 
7. The attorneys fees in the amount of $35,915.00 incurred by my firm were incurred 
in defending this matter and in pursuing the claims of the Defendants. The work on this case by my 
firm was performed primarily by me, my associate Bradley S. Richardson, and my paralegal Lorinda 
Tuttle. 
8. My rate for trial work in contested real estate cases such as the present one is $250.00 
per hour. My associate bills $200.00 an hour for these matters, and my paralegal bills at $140.00 per 
hour. 
9. Time records were kept by entering the time into a computer from which the billing 
statements were generated. Exhibit "A" identifies the attorney or paralegal who performed the 
service, sets forth the date the service was performed, provides a description of the services rendered, 
itemizes the amount of time needed to perform the service, sets forth the hourly rate charged for the 
service, and computes the fee charged for the service. These charges are consistent with the fees 
charged by other attorneys in this area oflaw with comparable experience and skill. 
10. Your Affiant has reviewed the provisions of Rule 54( e)(3) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides a list of criteria to be utilized by the Court in determining reasonable 
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attorneys fees. In evaluating the reasonableness of the fees charged herein, your Affiant would advise 
the Court as follows: 
(a) Time and Labor Involved: My finn keeps track ofthe time spent on cases 
by each individual attorney and/or paralegal. In addition, I have not submitted a request for time 
spent by my legal assistant who provided significant paralegal work in getting this matter ready for 
trial. I have reviewed the billing sheets generated from this case and believe the time and labor 
reported were reasonably and necessarily incurred to provide a proper defense and representation in 
this matter. 
(b) Novelty and Difficulty: While I would not classify this case as particularly 
novel or difficult to the extent it involves a broker's claim for commission, I do believe the case 
became more complex in that it invoked several licensing laws and consumer issues that added a 
greater degree of difficulty and novelty to the case. That being said, we worked to keep the case 
focused on its major issues in order to streamline the time, costs and fees incurred. 
(c) Skill, Experience and Ability: I acted as the lead attorney in this matter. I 
am an AIV rated attorney and have been practicing for more than 25 years almost exclusively in the 
area of civil litigation, including numerous jury trials. I feel I am qualified to act as trial counsel in 
civil litigation matters based upon my background and experience. 
Bradley S. Richardson joined our firm in July of 2006. Prior to that time, Mr. 
Richardson worked for another large law finn in the Boise area. Mr. Richardson graduated from the 
University of Idaho College of Law. During law school, Mr. Richardson was an e:xtern for the 
Honorable Judges Larry Boyle and Carl Kerrick. During the time he has been with our finn, Mr. 
Richardson has worked on many of my cases and has been responsible for many pre-trial matters and 
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trial support. I believe Mr. Richardson is qualified to act as counsel in these matters based upon his 
background, experience and ability. 
Lorinda Tuttle is a very experienced and capable paralegal with many years of 
experience. Ms. Tuttle is efficient and competent in providing legal services, and in providing trial 
support. Ms. Tuttle works on many of my cases and she is qualified to assist me in most civil 
litigation matters based upon her background and experience. 
(d) Prevailing Charges: The rates charged in this case are standard, customary 
and comparable to other amounts charged for trial work for private clients. This particularly is true 
given the time limitations and deadlines in our firm's preparation for trial in this matter. As such, 
I believe that our charges in this case are consistent with, or lower than, the fees charged by other 
attorneys in the area with comparable experience. In doing so, I would note the recent Supreme 
Court case of Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772,203 P 3d 702 (2009). In that case, the Idaho Supreme 
Court recognized the District Court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in the Boise 
area ranges from $250.00 an hour to $400.00 an hour. See ill. at 777, 203 P.3d at 707. 
( e) Fee: The fee arrangement among Defendants, Mr. Pica, and our law firm 
provides for hourly billings consistent with the rates set forth in Exhibit "A." 
(f) Time Limitations: As set forth above, we were brought into this case in order 
to fmalize preparation for trial and to take the lead in the trial proceedings. That being said, our time 
and preparation, in my opinion, was relativelyrninimal based upon my experience in numerous other 
commercial litigation trials. Further, much of the research, briefing, fact finding, discovery and 
negotiations had already taken place prior to my finn's involvement. 
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(g) Amount Involved & Results Obtained: In its Complaint, Plaintiff demanded 
$17,500 under the 2005 employment contract and $202,500 under the 2007 employment contract 
for a total of $220,000. Defendants offered to settle the case for $75,000 in new money, plus allow 
Plaintiff to keep $22,500 already in its possession. Plaintiff subsequently demanded $275,000 to 
resolve the matter. A $200,000 offer to settle was communicated the day before trial. At trial, 
Defendants received a complete defense verdict on these claims and Plaintiff was awarded nothing. 
Defendants also were awarded the nominal amount requested of $1,000 on their claim under the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Defendants did not recover on their claim for conversion. 
(h) Undesirability of Case: Idonotknowofanyundesirablefeatureofthecase. 
(i) Professional Relationship: I did not have any relationship with the 
Defendants prior to this lawsuit, but have had an ongoing professional relationship with counsel 
Derek Pica. 
(j) Award in Similar Cases: Awards in similar disputes vary widely depending 
upon the terms of the particular contracts and the broker's track record and interaction with 
consumers. 
(k) Computer-Assisted Research: Our firm utilizes, and did utilize in this case, 
computer-assisted research. The cost of computer research is not inexpensi ve, but we often view this 
cost as a part of doing business and did not pass this cost on to the client. As such, we have not 
requested reimbursement for this cost. I believe computer assisted research is appropriate to 
maximize an attorney's time and minimize the fees charged to the client. 
(1) Other Factors: I know of no other factors. 
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11. Based upon the foregoing, Defendants claim a total of$l, 123.54 in costs and $35,915 
in attorneys fees for the costs and services rendered by my fum. These fees and costs are separate, 
distinct and in addition to those incurred by co-counsel Derek Pica on behalf of Defendants. Ibelieve 
the amounts to be reasonably and necessarily incurred in this caSe by my firm. It would be in the 
best interest of justice to award these attorney fees and costs. 
12. Your Affiant reserves the right to supplement this affidavit with additional costs and 
fees pending the resolution of the post-trial motions. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
Dated this Rday of July, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & 
orneys for DefendantsfThird Party Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .,ffiay of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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LAW OFFICE 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL, eRA WFORD & GARRETT, LLP 
Tax LD. # 84-1370958 
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT 
Derek Pica 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
RE: Knipe v. Robertson et al. 
PREVIOUS BALANCE: 
LESS PAYMENTS APPLIED SINCE LAST 
BILLING: 
BALANCE FORWARD: 
TOTAL FEES FOR THIS BILL: 
TOTAL COSTS FOR THIS BILL: 
$35,915.00 
$1,123.54 
TOTAL DUE FOR THIS BILL: 







FEES & COSTS THROUGH: 
June 26, 2009 
PAYMENTS THROUGH: 







ITEMIZA TlON OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AND COSTS ATTACHED 
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300 
EXHIBIT 
b A I 
-~-..:..---
Page 2 
June 29, 2009 Invoice #: 16460 
File#: 3035-001 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS RATE AMOUNT 
6/19/09 RTW Conference with Client (1.2); begin 6.90 $250.00 1,725.00 
review of pleadings and Motion for 
Summary Judgment (5.7). 
BSR Legal analysis and evaluation of 1.60 $200.00 320.00 
Trial Brief reo facts of case and 
associated legal issues. 
LKT Research all network locations re: all 4.50 $140.00 630.00 
individuals on the jury panel. 
6/20/09 RTW Review research and case law from 15.80 $250.00 3,950.00 
research file (3.4); conference with 
Client and review Jury List and 
direct additional research (1.1 ); 
conference with counsel to develop 
trial theme (3.3); continued review of 
Pleadings and begin review of 
exhibits (5.8); review proposed Jury 
Instructions and note additions (2.2). 
BSR Legal analysis and evaluation of 4.50 $200.00 900.00 
files, pleadings, exhibits (2.8); 
research and legal analysis of Idaho 
case authorities reo Ellsworth Dobbs 
Rule and reo voiding commission 
were no closing on transaction (1 .7). 
LKT Continued research into all network 8.20 $140.00 1,148.00 
locations re: all individuals on the 
jury panel. 
6/21/09 RTW Review depositions and continued 11.00 $250.00 2,750.00 
review of exhibits in preparation for 
trial. 
6/22/09 RTW Continued preparation for trial and 15.40 $250.00 3,850.00 
meet with Client, including testimony 
preparation and review of Jury 
Panel. 
BSR Continued analysis and evaluation 2.40 $200.00 480.00 
of pleadings, exhibits, agreements, 
motions and submissions reo facts of 
case and evaluate electronic use of 
exhibits at trial. 
BSR Research and legal analysis of 4.50 $200.00 900.00 
cases from other jurisdictions reo 
Ellsworth Dobbs Doctrine and reo 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300 
Tax LD. # 84-1370958 
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voiding commissions based upon 
lack of closing on transaction (2.9); 
research and analysis of realtor 
codes of ethics, licenses statutes, 
and statutory trust fund 
requirements and their use at trial 
(1.6). 
Meeting with Clients to review facts 2.00 
of case and prepare for testimony of 
Clients and review potential jurors. 
Analysis of jury instructions and 1.60 
prepare supplemental instructions 
and verdict form. 
Continued research into all network 8.80 
locations re: all individuals on the 
jury panel (7.5); preparation of 
exhibits for use at trial (1.3). 
Travel to Payette, attend trial, return 16.00 
travel to Boise, and prepare for next 
day of trial. 
Research, analysis, and evaluation 2.20 
of secondary resource materials reo 
impeachment evidence against 
Knipe Land Company and its 
president, John Knipe. 
Legal analysis and evaluation of 7.40 
summary judgment briefing, trial 
briefs, punitive damage motions and 
other filings in preparation to draft 
motion motion for directed verdict 
(1.9); preparation of motion for 
directed verdict and renewed motion 
for summary judgment, including 
preparation of sections reo legal 
standards, regulatory requirements, 
need for closing, and forfeiture (5.5). 
Travel to Payette, attend trial, return 18.00 
travel to Boise, and prepare for 2nd 
day of trial, including outline of 
closing. 
Research and legal analysis of 2.10 
Idaho appellate authority reo 
requirements for property 
descriptions and reo use of tax 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300 
Tax I.D. # 84-1370958 
/17/ 
Page 3 










June 29, 2009 
notices as descriptions in broker 
representation agreements. 
BSR Research and legal analysis reo 1.40 
reduction of comission for breach of 
fiduciary duty, punitive damages 
under consumer act, on breach of 
fair dealing in preparation to draft 
additional jury instructions (.9); 
continued preparation of 
supplemental jury instructions and 
proposed verdict form (.5). 
BSR Travel to trial to provide 3.80 
impeachment evidence reo John 
Knipe and trial support reo 
impeachment of Plaintiffs real 
estate agent. 
6/25/09 RTW Travel to Payette, attend trial, take 16.20 
verdict and return travel to Boise. 
6/26/09 RTW Review Idaho Consumer Protection 4.80 
Act for remedies and effect of 
Judgment and Rules on Request for 
Additur and additional relief, 
including punitive damages. 
BSR Legal analysis and evaluation of 0.90 
requirements for submission of fees 
and costs as a matter of right and 
discretionary costs (.3); legal 
analysis and evaluation of attorney's 
fees under Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (.6). 
TOTAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 160.00 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300 
Tax I.D. # 84-1370958 
If 7'fJ-
Page 4 
Invoice #: 16460 









TIMEKEEPER HOURS RATE 
Robert T. Wetherell 104.10 $250.00 
Bradley S. Richardson 34.40 $200.00 






- thru June 26,2009 
Description Payee (if applicable) 
Copying - exhibits 657 @ 0.15 Expense Recovery 
Easel and pad Office Depot 
Copying - exhibits 570 @ 0.15 Expense Recovery 
Copying - 12 sets of 221 Expense Recovery 
(exhibits) 2652 @ 0.15 
Internet research re: jury panel Lorinda K. Tuttle 
Travel to Payette for trial Brad Richardson 
6-25-09 105 @ 0.55 105 @ 0.55 
Travel to Payette for trial Brad Richardson 
6-24-09120 @ 0.55 
Travel expenses during trial- Robert T. Wetherell 
round-trip from Boise to Payette 
3 days (165 x 3 = 495 miles) 
June 23, 24 and 25, 2009 - 495 
miles @ $.50/mile 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300 
Tax I.D. # 84-1370958 
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Travel expenses during trial -
meals during trial 
TOTAL COSTS 
Robert T. Wetherell 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & eRA WFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street, P. O. Box 1009, Boise, ID 83701-1009 - (208) 344-7300 
Tax LD. # 84-1370958 
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Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Fa .. csimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JUL 1 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTS/THIRD-P ARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
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COME NOW, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") by and through 
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and provides this Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as follows: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court should grant Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorneys 
Fees. This Memorandum will show that Plaintiff demanded $275,000 and essentially forced this 
matter to trial. hnmediately before trial, an offer to settle for $200,000 was made. More specifically, 
this Memorandum will show that: (1) this case involves a commercial transaction and therefore fees 
are to be given to the prevailing party; (2) Defendants are the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-120; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to fees and costs under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and (4) 
Defendants are entitled to costs under Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedu.re. 
II. 
PERTINENT FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
On April 16, 2008, PlaintiIDThird Party Defendants (herinafter "Plaintiff') filed a Complaint 
demanding $17,500.00 under the 1005 employment contract and $202,500.00 under the 2007 
Employment Contract, in addition to the $22,500 Plaintiff had already wrongfully retained. See ~ 
3-4 of Complaint. The Complaint also sought attorneys fees and costs incurred relating to this 
commercial transaction under I.C. § 12-120, as well as pre-judgment interest. See p. 6 of Complaint. 
On July 17, 2008, DefendantslThird Party Plaintiffs' (herinafter "Defendants") filed their 
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Answer and Third-Party Complaint. This pleading denied Plaintiff's assertion to the claimed monies 
and asserted their own claims for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Additionally, 
Defendants requested a return of monies held by Plaintiff in the amount of $22,500.00. In their 
pleadings, Defendants also sought recovery oftheir attorneys fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120 and the 
. Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
A few months before trial, Defendants offered $75,000.00 in new money to resolve this case, 
and would allow Plaintiff to retain the $22,500.00 already held in its possession. See p. 6 of Affidavit 
of Derek Pica in Support ofDefendants/Third Party Plaintiff's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees 
(hereinafter "Aff. of Pica"). This was done in an effort to resolve the matter without the time, 
expense and fees associated with trial. See id. Plaintiff refused to accept Defendants' settlement 
offer and demanded an amount more than contained in its original Complaint. See id. In fact, this 
demand increased the amount being sought by Plaintiff from $220,000.00, as originally set forth in 
the Complaint, to $275,000.00. See Exhibit "B" of Aff. of Pica. Thus, Plaintiff forced this case to 
proceed to trial. See id. 
On June 19, 2009, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford appeared in this matter to handle the lead 
in trial and to provide the necessary trial support for the case. See p. 5 of Aff. of Pica. This 
association between Mr. Pica and the firm ofBrassey, Wetherell & Crawford, was needed as Mr. 
Pica is a sole practitioner, and as Plaintiff often has more than one attorney attending hearings and 
providing pre-trial support. See id. As a result, this association was reasonable and necessary in this 
matter. See id. 
At trial, Plaintiff sought $220,000.00 under the 2005 and 2007 employment contracts. In 
contrast, Defendants asked the jury for nominal damages of $1 ,000.00 under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act and for the return of monies for their conversion claim in the amount of$22,500.00. 
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The jury rendered its verdict in this matter in favor of Defendants, specifically finding that 
Defendants did not breach the employment contracts. See Ans. to Question 1 of V erdict Fonn. Thus, 
the jury found Plaintiff was not entitled to any money. See Ans. to Question 3 of Verdict Fonn. In 
addition, the jury found that Plaintiff violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and awarded 
Defendants the requested nominal damages in the amount of$1 ,000.00. See Ans. to Questions 6 and 
7 of Verdict Form. The jury also found that Plaintiff did not convert the deposited money of 
$22,500.00 for his own use. See Ans. to Question 4 of Verdict Fonn. 
Defendants now bring this Motion to recover their costs and attorneys fees. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Defendants are Entitled to Attorneys Fees as This Matter Involves a Commer-
cial Transaction. 
Defendants are entitled to attorneys fees under I.e. § 12-120 as this case centers on two 
commercial employment contracts. The pertinent statutory provision regarding this issue provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument guaranty, or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the 
prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees to be set 
by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
See I.C. § 12-120(3)( emphasis added). 
Thus, it is well established that this statute mandates an award of attorneys fees to the 
prevailing party in actions involving commercial transactions. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 
903,915,204, P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009) (citation omitted); Dennettv. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 31, 936 
P.2d 219, 229 (1997). 
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The test for application of this statute is whether the commercial transaction comprises the 
"gravamen" of the lawsuit. See Dennett, 130 Idaho at 31,936 P.2d at 229. This means the statute 
applies where the "commercial transaction is integral to the claim," and constitutes the basis upon 
which a party is attempting to recover. Id. (citations omitted). 
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that this matter centers on a commercial transaction. 
As the Court is aware, this action deals primarily with two employment contracts entered into by the 
parties, one in 2005 and the other in 2007. Moreover, Plaintiff has effectively stipulated that 
attorneys fees are appropriate under I.C. § 12-120, as it has plead them it its Complaint. See p. 6 
of Complaint. As a result, I.C. § 12-120(3) applies to this case. 
B. Defendants are the Prevailing Party under I.C. § 12-120 and Therefore are 
Entitled to Attorneys Fees. 
Defendants are the prevailing party in this matter as they successfully defended against both 
of Plaintiff's claims and proved that Plaintiff violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure defines "prevailing party," providing in part: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider 
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties. 
See Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 777, 203 P.3d 702, 707 (2009) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). 
As such, the prevailing party question is examined from an "overall view," not a claim-by-
claim analysis. See Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (citing Eighteen 
Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating and Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 
(2005». Significantly, a Defendants' non-liability is evidence that it is the prevailing party. Id. 
In Shore, a district court found after a bench trial, that an accord and satisfaction had 
discharged the defendant's liability on a note. See id. at 905, 204 P.3d at 1116. However, the 
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defendant did not recover on his defense claim of conversion. Id. at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125. 
Therefore, the trial court subsequently denied the defendant's request for costs and attorneys fees. 
Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in holding that 
defendant was not the prevailing party. Id. at 915,204 P.3d at 1126. The Court recognized prior 
case authority, emphasizing that "a defendant's non-liability is evidence that it is the prevailing 
party." Id. 
In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating and Paving, Inc., 141, Idaho 716, 117 
P.3d 130 (2005), the Court also found reversible error where the trial court determined that "although 
the Defendants had successfully defended against the Plaintiff's complaint because they recovered 
only a small portion of what they desired on their counterclaim, they were not prevailing parties." 
See Shore. at 914, 204 p.3d at 1125. 
The holding by the Court in Eighteen Mile regarding this issue states: 
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating was 
a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused too 
much attention on the Company's less than tremendous success on its 
counterclaim and seemingly ignored the fact that the Company 
avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly 
undervalued the Company's successful defense. Avoiding liability is 
a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk 
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In 
litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a 
money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with 
a large money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who 
simply walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not 
ignore the value of a successful defense. ill this case, logic suggests 
that a verdict in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its 
counterclaim (albeit. a relatively small one), by definition, makes it 
a prevailing party. 
See Eighteen Mile, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133 (emphasis added.) 
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As was the case in Shore and Eighteen Mile, the primary issue in this matter has been 
Plaintiff's claim to recover $220,000.00 under the two employment contracts. As the Court is well 
aware, this was the subject matter of the vast majority of all briefing, discovery, and the trial 
proceedings. As such, the fact that Defendants successfully defended against these claims and 
Plaintiff received nothing, shows Defendants are the prevailing party. See ShOJ'e, 146 Idaho at 914, 
204 P.3d at 1125. Moreover, Defendants prevailed on their own claim for nominal damages under 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, Defendants are the prevailing parties, even if they 
did not recover fully on their Third-party Complaint. See id. (discussing Eighteen Mile, 141 Idaho 
at 719, 117 P.3d 133). 
The settlement demand by Plaintiff provides an additional basis showing that Defendants 
prevailed in this matter. It is well established that the trial court may consider the difference between 
a plaintiff s demand and a plaintiff s ultimate recovery in determining the prevailing party. Lake v. 
Purnell, 143 Idaho 818, 821,153 P.3d 1164, 1167 (2007)(citingEighteenMile, 141 Idaho 716,117 
P.3d 130). 
The facts in this case show that a few months before trial, Defendants offered $75,000.00 in 
new money to resolve this case, and would allow Plaintiff to retain the $22,500.00 already held in 
its possession. See p. 6 Aff. of Pica. This was done in an effort to resolve the matter without the 
time, expense and fees associated with trial. See id. Plaintiff refused to accept Defendants' 
settlement offer, and demanded an amount more than contained in its original Complaint. See id. 
In fact, this demand increased the amount being sought by Plaintiff from $220,000.00, as originally 
set forth in the Complaint, to $275,000.00. See Exhibit "B" of Aff. of Pica. Thus, Plaintiff forced 
this case to proceed to trial. See id. 
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As a result, the fact that Plaintiff recovered nothing on the most significant claims in this case 
shows that Defendants are the prevailing party. 
C. Defendants' are Entitled to Attorneys Fees and Costs Under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. 
Defendants prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act and are 
therefore entitled to costs and attorneys fees. Relevant statutory provision regarding this issue states: 
(5) Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs. In any action brought by a person under this 
section, the court shall award, in addition to the relief provided in this 
section, reasonable attorneys fees to the plaintiff if he prevails. the 
court in its discretion may award attorneys fees to a prevailing 
defendant if it finds that the plaintiff s action is spurious or brought 
for harassment purposes only. 
See I.C. § 48-608(5)(emphasis added). 
A review ofIdaho case authorities shows that the determination of attorneys fees under the 
Act is made through the application ofthe prevailing party analysis, as set forth in the prior section. 
See Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 124,27, 72 P.3d 864,867 (2003)(citing Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 
Idaho 79,81,741 P.2d366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987)); see also Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 
659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
Defendants prevailed on their claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. In fact, 
Defendants received the exact amount they requested at trial as nominal damages. As a result, 
Defendants are the prevailing party under the Act, and therefore are entitled to attorneys fees and 
costs. 
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D. Defendants are Entitled to an Award of Costs as a Matter of Right Under Rule 
54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of right in the amount of$1,876.58 pursuant to 
I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(C). An accounting ofthese claimed costs are set forth in the Affidavits of Robert 
T. Wetherell and Derek Pica, filed contemporaneously herewith. These costs were reasonably and 
necessarily incurred to defend this action. Therefore, as the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled 
to these costs as a matter of right. 
E. The Court Should Grant Discretionary Costs to Defendants Pursuant to Rule 
54( d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants also request an award of discretionary costs in the amount of$l ,647. ° 1 pursuant 
to I.R.c.P. 54(d)(1)(D). An accounting of these claimed discretionary costs are set forth in the 
Affidavits of Robert T. Wetherell and Derek Pica, filed contemporaneously herewith. The requests 
costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred to defend this action. Additionally, it should be noted 
that Defendants are not seeking all the travel costs associated with the various motions and discovery 
in this matter, as well as computerized legal research that is typically granted as a matter of right. 
As a result, the Defendants as the prevailing party in this matter respectfully request an award of 
these claimed discretionary costs. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant the instant Motion and award Defendants 
attorneys fees in the amount of$110,307.50 and costs in the amount of$3,533.34. 
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DATED this /3day of July, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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ORIGINAL THiFiO 
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.o. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEREK A. PICA 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS/ 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
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I 'irS 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
DEREK PICA, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That your Affiant is over the age of 21, and is competent to make this Affidavit and 
does so based upon his own direct and personal knowledge. 
2. That your Affiant is one of the attorneys of record for Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") and offers the following testimony based upon his knowledge 
and upon the accounts, records and ledgers kept by your Affiant's law firm in the ordinary course 
of business. Further, this Affidavit is made pursuant to Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
3. That the costs and fees are claimed in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, that your Affiant believes an award of costs and attorneys fees to 
the Defendants is proper and appropriate in this case on the grounds and for the reasons that 
Defendants are the prevailing party in this action pursuant to I.e. §§ 12-120(3),48-608(5), 12-121 
and Rule 54( d) and (e). Specifically, Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiff s claims for 
$220,000, and prevailed upon Defendants' own claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
4. That to the best of your Affiant's knowledge and belief, all the costs, disbursements 
and attorneys fees listed below and in any way associated with Defendants' Motion for Costs and 
Attorneys Fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred in litigating this matter in good faith, and 
that none ofthe costs and attorneys fees were incurred to vex, harass or annoy Plaintiff. Further, the 
costs and attorneys' fees were not incurred for the purposes of increasing the Plaintiff s costs and 
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attomeys fees in this matter. Your Affiant has review the costs and attomeys' fees set out below and 
in the corresponding Affidavit of co-counsel Robert Wetherell. I hereby attest that the items and 
accountings therein are true and accurate, and are presented to the Court in compliance with the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of your Affiant's firm's 
statement of account for this matter, as created in the normal and ordinary course of business. This 
statement reflects the legal services and costs performed or incurred byrne on behalf of Defendants. 
6. The following is a summary ofthe costs and attomeys fees incurred by me on behalf 
of Defendants: 
A. COSTS ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C) 
Filing fees: $71.00 
• Deposition transcripts and copying thereof: 
-M&M Court Reporting (deposition of Richard Robertson): $324.58 
-Burnham Habel (depositions of John Knipe & Rowena Strain): $981.00 
Total Costs as a Matter of Right (by me on behalf of Defendants): $1,376.58 
B. DISCRETIONARY COSTS ALLOWED UNDER I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(D) 
• Mediation (ElamBurke): $547.10 
• Postage: $120.12 
• Copies (2,440 @ 0.15): $366.00 
Total discretionary costs claimed: $1,033.22 
C. ATTORNEY FEES 
Attorneys fees incurred by me on behalf of Defendants amount to $74,392.50 
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TOTAL COSTS & FEES CLAIMED: $ 76,802.30 
7. The attorneys fees in the amount of $74,392.50 incurred by me were incurred in 
defending this matter and in pursuing the claims ofthe Defendants. This included most of the legal 
research, fact finding, formal discovery, briefing and negotiating prior to trial, as well as coordinating 
trial preparation and participating at trial. 
8. My rate for trial work in cases of this nature and size is $175.00 per hour for pretrial 
litigation, and $225 per hour for trial preparation and trial work. 
9. Time records were kept by entering the time into a computer from which the billing 
statements were generated. Exhibit "A" identifies the attorney who performed the service, sets forth 
the date the service was performed, provides a description of the services rendered, itemizes the 
amount oftime needed to perform the service, and computes the fee charged for the service. These 
charges are consistent with the fees charged by other attorneys in this area oflaw with comparable 
experience and skill. 
lO. Your Affiant has reviewed the provisions of Rule 54(e)(3) oftheldaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides a list of criteria to be utilized by the Court in determining reasonable 
attorneys fees. In evaluating the reasonableness of the fees charged herein, your Affiant would advise 
the Court as follows: 
(a) Time and Labor Involved: I keep an accounting oftime spent on my cases. 
I have reviewed all of the billing sheets generated from this case, including those submitted by Mr. 
Wetherell's firm, and believe the time and labor reported were reasonably and necessarily incurred 
to provide a proper defense and representation in this matter. 
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(b) Novelty and Difficulty: I believe this case was somewhat complex with 
respect to the contractual and licensing issues raised at summary judgment and again presented at 
trial. 
(c) Skill, Experience and Ability: I have been practicing for more than 20 years, 
during which time I have frequently engaged in civil litigation and have handled many contested 
matters. I feel I am qualified to act as trial counsel in civil litigation matters based upon my 
background and experience. 
(d) Prevailing Charges: The rates charged in this case are standard, customary 
and comparable to other amounts charged for trial work for private clients for this type of case. As 
such, I believe that our charges in this case are consistent with, or lower than, the fees charged by 
other attorneys in the area with comparable experience. In doing so, I would note the recent 
Supreme Court case of Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009). In that case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized the District Court's finding in another real estate case that trial work in 
the Boise area ranges from $250.00 an hour to $400.00 an hour. See id. at 777, 203 P.3d at 707. 
( e) Fee: The fee arrangement among Defendants, Mr. Wetherell and me provides 
for hourly billings consistent with the rates set forth in Exhibit "A." 
(f) Time Limitations: I had time limitations to the extent that I am a solo 
practitioner, and much of my work on this case was done without help from other attorneys or a 
paralegal. In contrast, Plaintiff had more than one attorney handling much of this matter, including 
attendance at hearings. As such, my association with Mr. Wetherell for support in trial was not only 
reasonable and appropriate, but necessary to properly defend this case. 
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(g) AmountInvolved & Results Obtained: In its Complaint, Plaintiff demanded 
$17,500 under the 2005 employment contract and $202,500 under the 2007 employment contract 
for a total of $220,000. Defendants offered to settle the case for $75,000 in new money, plus allow 
Plaintiff to keep $22,500 already in its possession. This was done in an effort to resolve this matter 
without the time, expense and fees associated with trial. Plaintiffrefused to accept Defendants' offer, 
and instead demanded $275,000. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of 
correspondence from Plaintiffs counsel to me dated March 26, 2009. This correspondence 
demanded $275,000 to resolve the case. Thus, Plaintiffs demand forced this case to proceed to trial. 
At trial, Defendants received a complete defense verdict on these claims and Plaintiff was awarded 
nothing. Defendants also were awarded the nominal amount requested of $1,000 on their claim 
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Defendants did not recover on their claim for conversion. 
(h) Undesirability of Case: I do not know of any undesirable feature on the case. 
(i) Professional Relationship: I have known the Defendants for several years 
and have represented them in other matters. 
(j) Award in Similar Cases: Awards in similar disputes vary widely depending 
upon the terms of the particular contracts and the broker's interactions with consumers. 
(k) Computer-Assisted Research: I use, and did utilize in this case, computer-
assisted research. The cost of computer research is not inexpensive, but I often view this cost as a 
part of doing business and did not pass this cost on to the client. As such, I have not requested 
reimbursement for this cost. I believe computer assisted research is appropriate to maximize an 
attorney's time and minimize the fees charged to the chent. 
(1) Other Factors: I know of no other factors. 
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11. Based upon the foregoing, I have incurred $ 74, 392.50 in attorneys fees and $2,409.80 
in costs for my services rendered on behalf of Defendants. These fees and costs are separate and 
distinct from those incurred by Mr. Wetherell's firm on behalf of Defendants. Thus, the total amount 
of attorneys fees incurred on behalf of Defendants by Mr. Wetherell's firm and me is $110,307.50, 
and the total cost incurred by Defendants is $3,533.34. Further, I believe these amounts were 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in this case on behalf of Defendants for their successful 
representation. 
12. Your Affiant reserves the right to supplement this affidavit with additional costs and 
fees pending the resolution ofthe post-trial motions. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
il-f 
Dated this ~ day of July, 2009 
(~ 
By ______________ ~ __________________ __ 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorneys for Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ay of July, 2009. 
Residing 
Commission expires: -....-4-~::=...-tl ______ .......",:....L.-. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \ '3 ~ay of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 




Robert T. Wetherell 
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Derek A. Pica 
KNIPE V. ROBERTSON 
SUMMARY 
(FEES & COSTS) 
Attorney's fees 
Attorney's fees (trial prep & trial) 
291.9 hours x 175.00 = $ 51,082.50 
103.6 hours x 225.00 = $ 23,310.00 
TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
Deposition Costs 
M & M Court Reporting (Richard Robertson) 
Burnham Habel (John Knipe & Rowena Strain) 
TOTAL DEPOSITION COSTS: 
Mediation (Elam Burke) 
Filing Fees 
Postage 












DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise ID 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette ID 83661 
In Reference To: Corporate matters 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
4/16/08 DAP Telephone conference with client; 
review Complaints and analyze; 
research Real Estate Code and 
statute of fraud issues; analyze 
Knipe "Employment Contracts," Review 
ethical rules for realtors 
4/17/08 DAP Telephone conference with Johnnie; 
continue research on statute of 
frauds and community property issues 
relating to Employment Agreement; 
telephone conference with Richard 
regarding contracts and venue 
4/18/08 DAP Draft letter to client; research 
venue issue 
4/22/08 DAP Review extensions; review documents 
provided by client 





1. 30 227.50 
9.20 $1,610.00 





Total amount of this bill 
Balance due 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH APRIL 23, 2008 








ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise 10 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette 10 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
4/30/08 DAP Review contracts as to venue; draft 
Motion for Change of Venue 
5/11/08 OAP Draft Answer; research affirmative 
defenses; begin draft of Counterclaim 
5/12/08 OAP Draft Third Party Claim; research 
duty of brokers; research 
pre-judgment interest issue in 
conversion case 
5/13/08 OAP Revise draft of Answer and Third 
Party Complaint; draft letter to 
clients 
5/14/08 OAP Telephone conference with cient 
regarding Answer and Third Party 
Complaint 
5/19/08 OAP Review Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Change of Venue; review 
supporting Affidavit; telephone 
conference with Richard Robertson; 





1. 70 297.50 
0.20 35.00 
3.30 577.50 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 2 
Hours Amount 
5/20/08 DAP Research venue issues 2.70 472.50 
For professional services rendered 15.30 $2,677.50 
Additional charges: 




Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
Balance due 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH MAY 22, 2008 








ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise 10 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette 10 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
5/29/08 DAP Research venue issues; begin draft 
of Memorandum in Response to 
Memorandum in Opposition 
5/30/08 DAP Complete draft of Memorandum in 
Response to Opposition Memorandum 
6/2/08 DAP Research Consumer Protection Act 
issues; telephone conference with 
Mark Geston 
6/9/08 DAP Prepare for hearing; attend Hearing 
on Motion for Change of Venue; 
telephone conference with Richard 
Robertson; draft Order Changing 
Venue; draft letter to Court; review 
proposed Protective Order 
6/10/08 DAP Review Interrogatoreis, Request for 
Admissions and Request for 
Production of Documents and analyze; 




1. 50 262.50 
2.40 420.00 
0.80 140.00 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
6/16/08 DAP Telephone conference with Richard 
Robertson regarding discovery; 
review E-mail from Mark Geston 
regarding Protective Order; review 
changes made to proposed Protective 
Order 
6/18/08 DAP Research Consumer Protection Act; 
draft Counterclaim 
6/20/08 DAP Continue research on Consumer 















Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
Balance due 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JUNE 23, 2008 







ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 3 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
2,647.05 2,753.92 1,616.05 0.00 0.00 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise ID 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette ID 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
6/25/08 DAP Begin draft of Responses to Request 
for Admissions 
6/26/08 DAP Complete draft of Responses to 
Request for Admissions; draft 
Answers to Interrogatories; draft 
Responses to Request for Production 
of Documents 
6/27/08 DAP Finalize draft of discovery 
responses; draft Letter to Richard 
Robertson 
7/1/08 DAP Draft letter to Mark Geston; 
telephone conference with Mark 
Geston; research discovery issues in 
regard to effect of change of venue 
7/2/08 DAP Draft letter to Mark Geston 
7/14/08 DAP Finalize Answer, Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint; draft 
Acceptance of Service; draft letter 
to Mark Geston 
/~Ol 
Hours Amount 
1. 40 245.00 
5.70 997.50 
1. 00 175.00 
1. 30 227.50 
0.30 52.50 
1. 30 227.50 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
7/18/08 DAP Review discovery responses; Draft 
Notice of Service; draft 
Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents 
For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 




Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
Balance due 












FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JULY 23, 2008 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 23, 2008 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
2,480.21 2,647.05 2,753.92 1,616.05 0.00 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise ID 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette ID 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
7/24/08 DAP Draft Requests for Admission; draft 
Notice of Service 
7/28/08 DAP Review letter from opposing counsel; 
review Deposition Notices; draft 
letter to clients 
8/5/08 DAP Review Knipe Land Company's Response 
to Counterclaim; draft letter to 
clients; review documents from First 
American Title; draft second letter 
to clients 
8/12/08 DAP Review E-mail and respond; draft 
letter to clients 
8/18/08 DAP Telephone conference with Richard 
Robertson regarding Depositions 
For professional services rendered 
Hours Amount 
1. 60 280.00 
0.40 70.00 




Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 2 
Additional charges: 
Amount 
8/21/08 Postage 8.80 
Copies 32.70 
Total costs $41. 50 
Total amount of this bill $741. 50 
Previous balance $9,497.23 
Balance due $10,238.73 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH AUGUST 22, 2008 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH AUGUST 22, 2008 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
3,221.71 0.00 2,647.05 2,753.92 1,616.05 
1'101 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise ID 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette ID 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
8/25/08 DAP Office conference with clients; 
attend deposition 
8/26/08 DAP Draft Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Request for Production of 
Documents 

















Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 2 
Amount 
Balance due $11,188.77 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
950.04 3,221.71 0.00 2,647.05 4,369.97 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise 10 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette 10 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
9/24/08 OAP Review Request for Trial Setting; 
draft Response to Request for Trial 
Setting 


















Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2008 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2008 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
1,023.84 0.00 3,221.71 0.00 7,017.02 
2 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise 10 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette 10 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
11/11/08 DAP Begin review of documents from 
discovery response; begin draft of 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
11/12/08 OAP Continue draft of Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; review discovery documents 
produced by Knipe 
11/13/08 OAP Continue draft of Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 







11/3/08 Payment to M & M Court Reporting for Deposition 
Costs 
324.58 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 2 
Amount 
Total costs $324.58 
Total amount of this bill $2,704.58 
Previous balance $11,262.57 
Balance due $13,967.15 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH NOVEMBER 24, 2008 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH NOVEMBER 25, 2008 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
2,704.58 73.80 950.04 741.50 9,497.23 
1'110 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise 10 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette 10 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2 1582.01 
Professional services 
11/26/08 DAP Review Scheduling Order and 
calendar; draft letter to client 
12/4/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
12/17/08 DAP Review Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on behalf of Knipe; review 
Affidavits in Support; review 
Memorandum in Support of Knipe's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and 
analyze; continue draft of 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
12/18/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; research Statute of Frauds 







Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
12/19/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum, 
research public policy issues 
12/22/08 DAP Research public policy issues; 
continue draft of Memorandum 
12/23/08 DAP Continue draft of Memorandum; 
research waiver issues 
12/24/08 DAP Review documents produced in 
discovery; continue draft of 
Memorandum 
12/26/08 DAP Continue research on waiver issue; 
continue draft of Memorandum 
For professional services rendered 
Previous balance 
Balance due 











FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH DECEMBER 26, 2008 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH DECEMBER 26, 2008 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
6,247.50 2,704.58 73.80 950.04 10,238.73 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise ID 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette ID 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
12/29/08 DAP Research Consumer Protection Act 
issues; continue draft of 
Memorandum; telephone conference 
with client 
12/30/08 DAP Office conference with Richard 
Robertson; draft Affidavit of 
Richard Robertson; prepare Exhibits; 
continue draft of Memorandum; 
research tortious conversion issues 
12/31/08 DAP Complete draft of Memorandum; draft 
Motion for Summary Judgment; draft 
Affidavit 
1/9/09 DAP Review Knipe Land's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and analyze; 
research issues raised in response 
1/12/09 DAP Research forfeiture issues raised in 







1. 80 315.00 
3.80 665.00 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
1/14/09 DAP Review Supplemental Reply Brief and 
analyze; prepare for hearing 
1/15/09 DAP Prepare for hearing 
1/16/09 DAP Prepare for hearing; travel to 
Payette 





Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
Balance due 













FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH JANUARY 22, 2009 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH JANUARY 22, 2009 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
12,466.01 2,704.58 0.00 73.80 11,188.77 
DEREK A. PICA 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise ID 83702 
336-4144 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette ID 83661 
In Reference To: Knipe vs. Robertson 
Invoice #2-1582.01 
Professional services 
1/26/09 DAP Review Reply Memorandum and analyze 
1/27/09 DAP Begin draft of Reply Memorandum 
1/28/09 DAP Continue draft of Reply Memorandum 
1/29/09 DAP Complete draft of Reply Memorandum 
2/6/09 DAP Prepare for Summary Judgment 
Argument; attend Summary Judgment 
Hearing in Payette 
2/17/09 DAP Review Decision and analyze; 
telephone conference with client 
2/18/09 DAP Draft letter to client 
For professional services rendered 
ICJ /5 
Hours Amount 








Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 2 
Additional charges: 
Amount 
2/20/09 Postage 5.80 
Copies 10.65 
Total costs $16.45 
Total amount of this bill $3,148.95 
Previous balance $26,433.16 
Balance due $29,582.11 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED THROUGH FEBRUARY 23, 2009 
PAYMENTS RECEIVED THROUGH FEBRUARY 23, 2009 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. ANY BILLS NOT 
PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE A 1% PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY 
UNPAID BALANCE. 
Current 30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 120 Days 
3,148.95 6,218.51 6,247.50 2,704.58 11,262.57 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette, ID 83661 
March 30, 2009 
In Reference To: Knipe v. Robertson 
Invoice #10056 
Professional Services 
3/3/2009 Draft Mediation Statement; telephone conference with John Magel; telephone 
conference with client 
3/4/2009 Attend Mediation; draft Deposition Notices 
3/6/2009 Research Doctrine of Merger issues 
3/7/2009 Research integration issues 




Total additional charges 
Total amount of this bill 
Accounts receivable transactions 
11/28/2008 Starting balance 
12/28/2008 Starting balance 
























Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
2/26/2009 Starting balance 
3/28/2009 Starting balance 
Total payments and adjustments 
Balance due 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
Professional services rendered through March 23, 2009 







ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE 
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE. 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette, ID 83661 
April 27, 2009 
In Reference To: Knipe v. Robertson 
Invoice #10121 
Professional Services 
3/24/2009 Review division of earnest money issues 
3/25/2009 Research division of earnest money issue at law library 
3/26/2009 Review letter from Mark Geston; draft letter to client; research modification 
issues 
3/27/2009 Research modification issues at law library; draft Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
3/29/2009 Continue draft of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summa;ry Judgment; 
ressearch modification issue 
3/30/2009 Complete draft of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
draft Motion for Summary Judgment; draft letter to Mark Geston; draft letter to 
client; review documents produced in discovery 
4/6/2009 Telephone conference with Mark Geston 
4/7/2009 Prepare for Deposition of Rowena Strain 
4/8/2009 Prepare for Deposition of Rowena Strain; partiCipate in Deposition; prepare for 
Deposition of John Knipe 






















Robertson Kennels, Inc. 




Total additional charges 
Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
Balance due 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
Professional services rendered through April 23, 2009 
Payments received through April 24, 2009 
Page 2 








ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE 
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE. 
11 :1..0 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette, ID 83661 
May 26, 2009 
In Reference To: Knipe v. Robertson 
Invoice #10190 
Professional Services 
4/24/2009 Review Motion to Amend Complaint and Motion in Limine and analyze; research 
voluntary payment issue; draft letter to client 
4/26/2009 Research voluntary payment issue; research parol evidence issues 
4/28/2009 Research voluntary payment issue 
4/29/2009 Draft Motion to Reconsider; begin draft of supporting Memorandum 
4/30/2009 Draft Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider; draft supporting 
Affidavit; research forfeiture issues in regard to breach of contract 
5/112009 Research parol evidence issues 
Research earnest moneyh issue and when broker earns a commission 
5/2/2009 Research when broker earns a commission and public policy issues 
5/3/2009 Begin draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend for Punitive 
Damages 






















Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
5/5/2009 Continue draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend; draft Affidavit 
of Richard Robertson 
5/6/2009 Complete draft of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend; complete 
draft of Affidavit of Richard Robertson; review Memorandum in Support of 
Motion in Limine and analyze 
5/7/2009 Draft Reply Memorandum to Mlotion in Limine; review Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and analyze; research cases raised 
in opposition memorandum 
5/8/2009 Draft Reply Memorandum to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
5/14/2009 Review Plaintiff's Reply Memorandums to Motion to Amend and Motion in 
Limine and analyze; prepare for Hearing 
5/15/2009 Prepare for Hearing; attend Hearing in Payette 
5/19/2009 Review Supplemental Briefing and analyze 
5/20/2009 Review Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production to 
Defendants; telephone conference with Richard Robertson; draft Answers to 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents; review Third Request 
for Production of Documents; draft Responses to Third Set of Request for 
Production 
For professional services rendered 
Additional Charges: 
5/112009 Deposition Costs paid to Court Reporters 
5/21/2009 Postage 
Copying cost 
Total additional charges 





























Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
Professional services rendered through May 21, 2009 
Payments received through May 22, 2009 
Page 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE 
A 1 % PER MONTH INTEREST CHARGE ON ANY UNPAID BALANCE. 
3 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Invoice submitted to: 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
8719 Little Willow Road 
Payette, ID 83661 
July 07,2009 
In Reference To: Knipe v. Robertson 
Invoice #10278 
Professional Services 
6/8/2009 Telephone conference with Eric Bjorkman 
6/9/2009 Telephone conference with Mark Norem 
6/10/2009 Review Decision on Motions and analyze; draft letter to client; begin draft of Jury 
Instructions 
6/11/2009 Review E-mails from Mark Geston; continue draft of Jury Instructions; prepare 
for Trial 
6/12/2009 Finalize Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions; review proposed Stipulation 
of Facts; draft letter to Mark Geston; continue preparing tor Trial 
6/14/2009 Telephone conference with client; prepare Exhibits; review Plaintiffs Exhibit List; 
revise proposed Stipulated Facts; prepare for Trial 
6/15/2009 Draft Exhibit List; draft Witness List; begin draft of Trial Brief; research definition 
of forfeit; prepare for Trial 
6/16/2009 Research forfeiture issue; draft Trial Brief; review and respond to E-mails; 
prepare for Trial; telephone conference with Richard Robertson 
6/17/2009 Review each Exhibit listed by Plaintiff to determine whether to stipulate; 
telephone conference with MidAmerica's attorney regarding confidentiality 
agreement and Cindy Crane; prepare for Trial 
6/18/2009 Draft letter to Mark Geston; review Motion in Limine; draft Objection to Motion in 






















Robertson Kennels, Inc. 
6/19/2009 Review proposed Stipulation regarding Exhibits; review Motion regarding 
Protective Order and analyze; office conference with cllient; conference with 
Bob Wetherell; prepare for Trial 
6/20/2009 Preparation for Trial 
6/21/2009 Preparation for Trial 
6/22/2009 Telephone conference with Mark Norem's Office; draft Affidavit of Mark Norem; 
office conference with client; prepare for Trial 
6/23/2009 Prepare for Trial; travel to Payette and attend Trial 
6/24/2009 Travel to Payette and attend Trial 
6/25/2009 Travel to Payette; attend Trial 




Total additional charges 
Total amount of this bill 
Accounts receivable transactions 
3/912009 Starting balance 
Total payments and adjustments 
Balance due 
VISA and MASTERCARD accepted 
Professional services rendered through June 25, 2009 


































Robertson Kennels, Inc. Page 
ALL BILLS DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE 10TH OF EACH MONTH. BILLS NOT PAID BY THE 10TH SHALL ACCRUE 




ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
March 26, 2009 
VIAE-MAIL 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Re: Knipe Land Company v. Robertson 
Dear Derek: 
MARK S. GESTON 
Direct (208) 387-4291 
msgesto~@stoel.com 
101 S. Capitol !!Qulc:vard. Suite 1900 




In response to your clients' prior offer of $75,000 as full settlement of this controversy, Plaintiff 
counter-proposes a full settlement in exchange for a cash payment of $275,000. I believe that we 
fully aired our respective clients' positions during the mediation, so I will not repeat those 
arguments. I'm sure this proposal will receive your clients' serious consideration, and I look 
forward to their response. 
Sincerely; 
Mark S. Geston 
MSG/sIg 
cc: clients 






1 d a h 0 
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
MOTION FOR EQUITABLE 
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 1 
/'1~V 
coum 
COME NOW, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "'Defendants") by and through 
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and hereby move the Court for additional 
equitable relief under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, including but not limited to, the provisions 
and remedies set forth in I.C. § 48-608(1). Specifically, the Court should utilize its equitable 
remedies under the Act and impose a constructive trust and grant restitutionary damages relating to 
the $22,500.00 plus interest that Plaintiff and/or Third-party Defendant kept in its possession from 
the 2007 employment contract. Additionally, the Court should grant an Order enjoining Plaintiff 
from utilizing any broker employment contract containing the violative "Forfeiture" provision. 
Finally, the Court should award Defendants punitive damages under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act. This motion is supported by a corresponding legal memorandum, filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this ,!3'day of July, 2009. 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
erell, Of the Firm 
ttomeys for Defendants 
MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 2 
1-'1:2, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of July, 2009, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing upon each ofthe following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 




MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 3 
I'~O 
n Il P.p. 
~« <iL...i-u • ..! ."..J 
ORIGINAL 
Robert T. Wetherell, ISB No. 3011 
Bradley S. Richardson, ISB No. 7008 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
KNIPE LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband 
and wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
DEFENDANTSITHIRD-P ARTY 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER THE 
IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT 
DEFENDANTSITHIRD-PARTYPLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFMOTIONFOREQUITABLE 
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 1 
< I'~I 
COME NOW, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs (hereinafter "Defendants") by and through 
their counsel of record, Brassey, Wetherell & Crawford, and provide this Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Equitable Reliefunder the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as follows: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
After the closing of both parties' cases at trial, the Court took up its potential jury 
instructions. At that time, counsel for Defendants requested that the jury be instructed on punitive 
damages, which decision by the jury would be advisory to the Court under its authority pursuant to 
the Act. The Court declined the request, and instead stated it would consider such evidence if and 
when the jury found liability under Idaho's Consumer Protection Act. 
At trial, the jury granted Defendants their requested amount of nominal damages under the 
Act. Significantly, the facts at trial showed that Plaintiffandlor Mr. John Knipe purposefully waited 
to disclose to Defendants that they were seeking their all eged earnest money. Plaintiffhad not sought 
such money under the 2005 employment agreement. As such, Plaintiff did not notify Defendants of 
this fact until Defendants renewed their 2007 representation agreement with Plaintiff. Further, the 
evidence showed that Plaintiff utilized a contract that would give it more money by not closing on 
the transactions under the 2007 contract, than it would have received in real estate commissions had 
the transaction closed. 
Defendants now move the Court to grant the equitable remedies enumerated under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. Under the Act, the Court is allowed to grant particular remedies to 
DEFENDANTS/THIRD-PARTYPLAINTIFFS'MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFMOTIONFOREQUITABLE 
RELIEF UNDER THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - 2 I' ~ ~ 
Defendants on their claim. This Memorandum will show that the Court should: (1) impose a 
constructive trust and grant restitutionary damages for the return of monies improperly held by 
Plaintiff; (2) enjoin Plaintiff from future use of its forfeiture provision, (3) grant punitive damages 
to Defendants, and (4) grant Defendants prejudgment interest. 
As such, the Court should grant the instant Motion. 
II. 
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act allows a party to seek equitable relief from the Court 
as well as actual or statutory damages. See I.C. § 48-608(1). The Act states as to this issue: 
48-608. Loss from purchase or lease -- Actual and punitive 
damages. 
(1) . . . Any such person or class may also seek restitution, an 
order enjoining the use or employment of methods, acts or prac-
tices declared unlawful under this chapter and any other appropri-
ate relief which the court in its discretion may deem just and 
necessary. The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages 
and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or 
proper in cases of repeated or flagrant violations. 
See I.C. § 48-608(1). 
A. The Court Should Impose a Constructive Trust and Restitutionary Damages 
for the Return of Money Held by Plaintiff. 
The Court should impose a constructive trust and require the return of monies held by 
Plaintiff. As set forth above, Courts may grant any appropriate relief to parties that bring suit 
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See I.e. 48-608(1). In this case,the Court should 
impose a constructive trust and order the return of all monies held by Plaintiff from the 2007 
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transaction. Plaintiff admitted from the stand and in deposition testimony that there is no 
contractual provision allowing Plaintiff to withhold the $22,500 and that it was deducted and 
held in anticipation of closing. 
Under Idaho law, constructive trusts are equitable in nature and are invoked where title to 
property "is found in one who in fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it." Clein v. Shaw, 
109 Idaho 237,240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985). Once a constructive trust is imposed, 
the party holding the property is treated as ifhe or she were a trustee from the date of the 
wrongful holding. Id. Thus, the trustee is required to reconvey the property. Id. Further, a 
constructive trust applies where a party obtains property in any ''unconscientious manner." See 
id. 
The need for a constructive trust in this matter is clear. Plaintiff retained $22,500 in 
money owed to Defendants under the transaction with Mid-America. Therefore, this property 
must be reconveyed by Plaintiff to Defendants. The jury found that Defendants did not breach 
the 2007 employment agreement, but rather that Plaintiff violated the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act. As a result, the Court should apply its equitable authority and impose a constructive trust. 
This order from the Court will allow for the return of the money along with pre-judgment interest 
from the "date of the wrongful holding" by Plaintiff. As such, equity invokes this result. 
This result is consistent with the remedy of restitution under the Act. Although restitution 
is not an automatic or mandatory remedy under the Act, it is clearly one that Courts may invoke. 
See Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101 Idaho 447, 455,615 P.2d 116, 124 (1980). 
Further, a district court's discretion to award restitutionary relief should be exercised with a view 
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towards the Act's purpose. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the need for proper 
restitution under the Act. In its holding in Kidwell, stating: 
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act indicates a legislative intent to 
deter deceptive or unfair trade practices and to provide relief for 
consumers exposed to proscribed practices. Businesses faced only 
with the possibility of a perspective injunctive order would have 
little incentive to avoid commercial practices of dubious legality. 
Only a substantial likelihood that defendants who have engaged in 
unfair or deceptive trade practices will be subject to restitutionary 
orders will deter many with a mind to engage in sharp practices. 
Id. at 455-56,615 P.2d at 124-25 (emphasis added). 
Further, the Court in Kidwell cited approvingly of other case authority holding that 
wrongdoers should not be allowed to retain "the considerable benefits of their unlawful conduct." 
Id. at 456,615 P.2d at 125. Thus, restitution under the Act includes the surrendering of all 
monies taken in association with the party's violation of the Act. Id. (quoting Fletcher v. 
Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 591 P.2d 51,57 (Cal. 1979»("One requirement of such enforcement 
is a basic policy that those who have engaged in proscribed conduct surrender all profits flowing 
therefrom.") . 
As a result, the Court in this matter should grant restitutionary damages as Plaintiff s 
actions have been deemed to violate the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See Ans. to Question 6 
of Verdict Form. Specifically, the evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff could make more 
money under a contract by not closing on transactions and by continuing to re-enlist Defendants 
under a new representation contract. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff kept $22,500.00 from a 
transaction under the 2007 Employment Contract while at the same time violating the Act. The 
Plaintiff did this despite no contractual authority to do so. The granting of restitution of damages 
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will further the legislative intent to deter deceptive and unfair trade practices and provide relief to 
Defendants as consumers. Thus, Plaintiff should be required to surrender the benefits/profits 
made from its violative conduct. See Kidwell, 101 Idaho at 456,615 P.2d at 125; see also Great 
Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767,979 P.2d 627, 640 
(1999)( stating that restitution or unjust enrichment provides that one party will "render to the 
person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience belongs to the latter"). 
B. The Court Should Enjoin Plaintiff from Future Use of its "Forfeiture" 
Provision as contained in its Broker Employment Contracts. 
The Court should grant injunctive relief to ensure that Plaintiff does not engage in similar 
conduct with other consumers in the future. Under the Act, a court is empowered to grant an 
order "enjoining the use or employment of methods, acts or practices declared unlawful" 
pursuant to the Act. See I.C. § 48-608(1). As set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court, the use of 
injunctive relief is needed under the Act, otherwise "(b )usinesses faced only with the possibility 
of a prospective injunctive order would have little incentive to avoid commercial practices of 
dubious legality." Kidwell, 101 Idaho at455, 615 P.2d at 124. 
In this matter, injunctive relief is needed to ensure that Plaintiff does not re-use the same 
practices found to violate the Act. This will prevent numerous other consumers from experienc-
ing the same situation that occurred in the instant matter. As a result, the Court should grant 
injunctive reliefto enjoin future use and business practices associated with Plaintiffs forfeiture 
provision as contained in its broker employment contracts. 
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C. The Court Should Grant Punitive Damages to Defendants. 
After the closing of both parties' cases, the Court took up its potential jury instructions. 
At that time, counsel for Defendants requested that the jury be instructed on punitive damages, 
which decision by the jury would be advisory to the Court under its authority pursuant to the Act. 
The Court declined this invitation and instead stated it would consider such evidence at a later 
time. 
The Court now should grant punitive damages to Defendants under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. The Act states regarding the award of punitive damages: 
The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may 
provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary and proper in 
cases of repeated or flagrant violations. 
See I.C. § 48-608(1). 
As such, a party does not have to show extreme deviation from reasonable standards of 
conduct or other similar items, but merely must show that the offending party repeatedly or 
flagrantly violated the Act. See Mack Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 198,879 P.2d 1126, 
1131 (1994). Notably, this punitive damage standard under the Act is not an abrogation or 
codification of common law punitive damages, but rather presents an entirely new remedy 
created by the Legislature. See id. 
In determining punitive damages under the Act, the Court should look to the situation 
taken as a whole. See In Re. Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839, 883 (D. Idaho 2007). Further, an award of 
punitive damages under the Act is appropriate to both punish the violating party's conduct, and 
to deter any similar future activities. See id. 
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As the Court is well aware, the amount of actual damages recovered is irrelevant to 
punitive damages, as the awarding of nominal damages is sufficient to support a punitive damage 
award. See id. (citing Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., 111 Idaho 939, 729 P.2d 414,419 (Ct. 
App. 1996) and Young v. Scott, 108 Idaho 506, 700 P.2d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
At trial, the jury granted Defendants their requested amount of nominal damages under 
the Act. Significantly, the facts at trial showed that Plaintiff purposefully waited to disclose to 
Defendants that they were seeking their alleged earnest money. Plaintiff had not sought such 
money under the 2005 employment agreement. As such, Plaintiff did not notify Defendants of 
this fact until Defendants renewed their 2007 representation agreement with Plaintiff. Further, 
the evidence showed that Plaintiff utilized a contract that would give it more money by not 
closing on the transactions under the 2007 contracts, than would be received in real estate 
commissions had the transaction closed. Finally, Defendant was fraudulently induced to enter 
into an extension of the 2007 employment agreement by intentional non-disclosure of a demand 
letter drafted but not presented until 2 days after Defendant's signature was obtained. Please 
see Exhibit "A" attached hereto and as previously admitted at trial. Plaintiffthen sued Defendant 
in this action for breach of contract after Defendant refused to the extension he was fraudulently 
induced to enter into. 
Therefore, the Court should impose punitive damages. Defendant would request that 
Plaintiffbe required to return the $22,500 plus interest and that proper punitive damages would 
treble this amount. Therefore, Defendant seeks $67,500 in punitive damages to deter Plaintiff 
from engaging in such deceptive practices in the future. 
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D. Pre-Judgment Interest 
The Court should grant pre-judgment interest to Defendants based upon the $22,500 that 
Plaintiff received and held in his possession. As set forth above, Defendants are entitled to a 
constmctive trust and restitutionary damages in this amount from the date in which the unlawful 
holding or taking of these monies occurred. More specifically, Idaho statute grants pre-judgment 
interest where money is "received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable time 
without the owner's consent." See I.e. § 28-22-104(4). Further, pre-judgment interest merely 
requires that the damages be liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process. Ross v. 
Ross, 145 Idaho 274, 276, 178 P.3d 639,641 (Ct. App. 2007)(citation omitted). 
In the instant action, Plaintiff received and held monies belonging to Defendants in the 
amount of $22,500. These monies have been retained beyond a reasonable time despite Defen-
dants' demand for the return ofthese funds. As such, the Court should grant Defendants' pre-
judgment interest on the amount of $22,500 from the time Plaintiff failed to return the demanded 




Based upon the foregoing, the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Equitable 
Relief, including the imposition of a constmctive trust, restitutionary damages, enjoining Plaintiff 
from future use of its forfeiture provision, and granting punitive damages and pre-judgment 
interest. 
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DATED this ~ay of July, 2009. 
o rt . Wetherell, Of the Firm 
torneys for Defendants 
C TIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this §day of July, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered 
by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Mark S. Geston 
Stoel Rives, LLP 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 1900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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Subject: FW: Richard Robertson 
Date: Tuesday, February 19, 2008 10:45 PM 
From: John Knipe <john@knipeland.com> 
To: "sellerfile@knipeland.cotn n <sellerfile@knipeland.com> 
---- Forwarded Message 
From: John Kni.pe <john@knipeland.com> 
Date: Ttiu, 14 Feb 2008 12:20:03 -1000 
To: Rowena Strain <ronastrain@yahoo.com> 
Subject: lte: Ri.cb.ar:d· Robertson 
Rainy here but not cold. 
sent from my iPhone 
John Kn.ipe Designated Broker 
Accredited Land Consultant 
ABa ALe CRB GRI 
John@knipeland.com 
On Feb 14, 2008, at 9:11 AM, RoweIla Strain <ronastrain@yahoo.com> wrote: 
> John, 
> Let's not send that today. Let him get out the contract anq read 
> first. If you send today-I am afraid that he will be furious and 
> we will suffer our reputation. Why don't you wait for at least 
> tomorrow. 
> Rowena (I will hate yOu if you are come back "water 199ged and all 
> b:r:= from Stm tanning!) 
> 
> 
> Rowena strain, GRI RLI 208-739-3883-Cell 
> Sales Associate ID/oR 642-3744--Dffice 
> Knipe Land Camp!UlY, me 
> rowena@knipeland.com 
---- End of Forwarded Message 
Wed. Feb 20, 2008· 8:48 AM 
EXHIBIT 
!" A JJ . j Page 1 of 1 
KLC01863 
Subject: ~e: payette property 




Wed. Feb 20, 2008 8:47 AM 
The $22,500.00 is the .05 percent real Astate fee for 
selling the property and I thought since it didn't sell it 
would come .back to us. 
That is interesting on the Fre"nch company looking for a 
place to build a plant,maybe somebody should get in touch 
with them? 
Richard 
,7 The year's hottest artists on the red carpet at the Grammy Awards. AOL Music 
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KLC01861 
Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jrnreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 




RICHARD A. ROBERTSON AND 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD A. ROBERTSON and 
JOHNNIE L. ROBERTSON, husband and 
wife; and ROBERTSON KENNELS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN KNIPE, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008-682 
PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
o ORIGINAL 
PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR 
NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT-l 
Boise-221699.20010908-00008 
COME NOW Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe 
(collectively, "Knipe"), by and through their undersigned counsel, and move this Court under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to amend the Judgment entered on July 7, 2009. The 
Judgment, as entered, impermissibly recites the pleadings in its numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 
in violation ofIdaho Rule Civil Procedure 54( a). The jury's verdict, on which the Judgment 
should have been based, was complete and decided all issues framed by the parties in their 
pleadings and tried to that jury, and the Court is without power to nevertheless declare the 
Judgment as not being final until it so certifies the Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b). Furthermore, the Court is without power to keep this litigation open to allow Defendants 
and Third Party Plaintiffs to file additional claims and causes of action under the Idaho 
Consumer Protect Act, such parties having had a full and complete opportunity at trial to present 
all claims for relief that they wished to assert. 
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59( a)(6) for new trial on 
the ground that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to justify the jury's verdict. The 
said verdict was, additionally, against the law insofar as it denied Plaintiff any relief and, 
equally, granted Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs a judgment of $1 ,000 against John Knipe 
under Idaho Code § 48-608(1). 
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) for a new trial 
on the ground that there were errors in law during the course of the trial that prejudiced their 
substantial rights. 
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that application of the correct legal standards to the 
PLAINTIFF/THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR 
NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT - 2 
Boise-221699.2 0010908-00008 
undisputed evidence adduced at trial requires the entry of judgment in Knipe's favor in the 
principal amount of $220,000, together with prejudgment interest thereon. 
This Motion is based on the matters on file herein, the evidence admitted at trial, the 
Court's rulings at trial, and on the Memorandum oflaw submitted contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED: July 2.0 ,2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
~~L/ 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF/THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify on July '2.0 ,2009, I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/ 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR NEW 
TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT on the following, in the matter indicated below: 
Derek A. Pica, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
199 N Capitol Boulevard, Suite 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 336-4144 
Facsimile: (208) 336-4980 
Email: derekpica@msn.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
Robert T. Wetherell 
BRASSEY, WETHERELL & CRAWFORD, LLP 
203 W. Main Street 
P. O. Box 1009 
Boise,ID 83701-1009 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Email: rtw@brassey.net 
Attorneys for Defendants 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[y-Via Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
[ ] Via U.S. Mail 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[ ] Via Overnight Mail 
[ '-t\'ia Hand Delivery 
[ ] Via Email 
Mark S. Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Mark S. Geston, ISB No. 1346 
Email: msgeston@stoel.com 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt, ISB No. 7432 
Email: jmreinhardt@stoel.com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
101 S Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1900 
Boise,ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 389-9000 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9040 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The jury's verdict denied Plaintiff Knipe Land Company ("KLC") any relief but granted 
Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs Richard A. Robertson, Johnnie L. Robertson, and 
Robertson Kennels, Inc. (collectively, the "Robertsons") a judgment of $1 ,000 against Third 
Party Defendant John Knipe for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Idaho Code 
§§ 48-603 and 48-608) (the "ICPA"). Over the objection ofKLC and Third Party Defendant 
John Knipe (collectively, unless otherwise noted, "Knipe"), the Court entered Judgment in the 
form requested by the Robertsons on July 7, 2009 (the "Judgment"). 
Knipe first moves the Court under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( e) to amend the 
Judgment, first to eliminate the extensive recitation of the pleadings in its numbered paragraphs 
1, 2, and 3. Such a narrative in a judgment is prohibited by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( a). 
Secondly, the Judgment improperly allows the Robertsons to file additional claims and 
seek additional relief under the ICPA when, in fact, they had the fullest opportunity to litigate all 
their claims under that statute and did so at trial. 
Thirdly, the jury's verdict addressed all the Robertsons' claims under the ICPA and fully 
resolved the present controversy, but the Judgment inexplicably declares itself not to be a final 
judgment and invokes Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as the authority for that 
determination. But Rule 54(b) is only concerned with interlocutory rulings by a court that 
resolve "one or more but less than all of the claims" in a given case. There is no rule, statute, or 
authority that permits a court to unilaterally declare a judgment that embodies a verdict rendered 
after trial of the entire controversy as being anything but a final judgment and impermissibly 
grant a litigant a belated opportunity to introduce new claims and causes of action. 
Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) for a new trial 
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on the ground that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to justify the jury's verdict. The 
critical language in the two contracts in controversy (the "Employment Contracts") was clear and 
unambiguous, and the uncontradicted evidence and testimony showed that the monies paid by 
the prospective purchasers of the Robertsons' land fell within the scope of that language, but that 
the Robertsons had not complied with it. The only evidence at trial that could possibly be 
inconsistent with that conclusion was the subjective "feeling" of Defendant Richard Robertson 
that the Employment Contracts' language intended something it plainly did not say, and the 
equally subjective testimony of the only other witness called by the Robertsons, Cindy Crane, 
concerning the entirely separate land purchase contracts entered into by the Robertsons and her 
employer, MidAmerican Nuclear Energy Co. LLC ("MidAmerican,,).l 
Knipe also moves the Court under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( a)(7) for a new trial 
on the ground that errors of law substantially prejudiced Knipe's rights and entitles them to a 
new trial on all issues. Those errors of law consisted of the following: 
(1) The Court refused to decide whether the Employment Contracts were 
ambiguous and improperly left that determination to the jury; 
(2) The Court permitted Mr. Robertson to interpret unambiguous agreements 
for the jury; 
(3) The Court permitted Ms. Crane to interpret unambiguous agreements that 
Knipe was not a party to and that the Court found in its June 9, 2009 Order on Motions 
did not concern "the same fundamental subject matter" as the Employment Contracts; 
(4) The Court permitted Ms. Crane to testify even though the Robertsons had 
1 Ms. Crane had nothing at all to say about the two Employment Contracts in 
controversy. 
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refused to respond to Interrogatories requesting them to disclose what relevant 
knowledge they believed she possessed; 
(5) The Court allowed the Robertsons' counsel to cross-examine John Knipe 
and Rowena Strain about the requirements Idaho Code § 54-2051 imposes on Idaho real 
estate agents and brokers and to then argue the testimony thusly elicited to the jury at 
closing, despite the Court's prior express finding in its Order on Motions on June 9, 2009, 
at page 5, that such statutes are not applicable to civil controversies such as the one at 
bar; 
(6) The Court refused to submit Knipe's requested opening Instruction No.5, 
and closing Instruction Nos. 7, 12, 15, 19, and 20; 
(7) The Court gave opening Instruction No.4, instructing the jury that the 
parties were agreed that the earnest monies deposited by MidAmerican included "the 5% 
commission" disbursed to Knipe when, in fact, the June 17,2009 Stipulation of the 
parties did not so characterize those payments; 
(8) The Court gave Instruction Nos. 11, 12, and 13, incorrectly allowing the 
jury to determine that the Employment Contracts were ambiguous and inviting it to 
consider extrinsic evidence to interpret them, or, in the absence thereof, to construe the 
Employment Contracts against Knipe as the drafting party; 
(9) The Court gave Instruction No. 16, instructing the jury as to the 
Robertsons' affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel when the evidence failed to satisfy 
the criteria for such affirmative defense; 
(10) The Court gave Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to find violations of 
the ICP A that had no support in the evidence, inadequately instructed on what was 
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needed to show a violation of that statute, and ignored the fact that the ICPA was 
inapplicable to the present controversy as a matter of law. 
Finally, Knipe alternatively moves under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the jury's verdict was not a reasonable 
adjudication of the controversy, given the unambiguous terms of the Employment Contracts and 
the undisputed factual evidence. The law and undisputed evidence also shows that there was no 
violation of the ICPA by John Knipe. 
II. FACTS 
KLC is a licensed Idaho real estate brokerage. The Robertsons own approximately 3,300 
acres of rural land in Payette and Washington Counties, Idaho. Richard and Johnnie Robertson 
signed an Employment Contract with KLC in 2005 to market the portion of their land titled in 
their own names (the "2005 Employment Contract"; Knipe Ex. 4). In early 2007, Robertson 
Kennels, Inc. entered into a second Employment Contract, listing the portion of the land titled in 
its name for sale by KLC (the "2007 Employment Contract"; Knipe Ex. 17). 
Both Employment Contracts contained identical language: "Should a deposit or amounts 
paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one half thereof may be retained by you [KLC], as the 
broker, as the balance shall be paid to me [the Robertsons]. The Broker's share of any forfeited 
deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall not exceed the commission.,,2 
On August 15,2007, KLC and the Robertsons agreed to extend the Employment Contracts' 
effective terms until February 28, 2008, and reduced KLC's commission rate on a sale to 5%. 
2 The second quoted sentence would place a cap on KLC's share of forfeited earnest 
monies. The Court's Instruction No. 11 informed the jury that both sentences were "in dispute." 
However, the Robertsons never made any such argument, and the uncontradicted evidence 
PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 5 
Boise-221700.4 0010908- 00008 I tt::'J 5/ 
KLC procured purchasers for the land covered by the 2005 Employment Contract, the 
Harmons. The Harmons signed a contract to purchase that land on November 1,2005 and paid 
$50,000 in earnest money. However, their purchase obligation was contingent on the sale of 
their own property first. The Robertsons and the Harmons subsequently agreed that $35,000 of 
that earnest money was no longer subject to that contingency. Because the $35,000 would no 
longer be returned to the Harmons-it would be forfeited if there was no closing and would be 
applied to the purchase price of the land if there was a closing-the Harmons and the Robertsons 
agreed that it could be dispersed to the Robertsons. The Harmons' real estate agent conveyed the 
$35,000 in two payments to KLC, and KLC, in tum, disbursed the money to the Robertsons. 
Afterward, however, the Harmons decided they could not purchase the land and terminated their 
contract with the Robertsons. (Knipe Ex. 13.) The $15,000 still subject to the purchase 
agreement's contingency was returned to the Harmons, but they lost all claim to the $35,000 
previously released from the contingency and disbursed to the Robertsons. Neither KLC nor the 
Robertsons then mentioned this $35,000 or had any dealings that concerned it until February 19, 
2008 when KLC demanded half of it from the Robertsons. (Robertsons Ex. RR.) 
The Robertsons next listed the rest of their property with KLC on February 6, 2007 ("the 
2007 Employment Contract"). (Knipe Ex. 17.) Like its predecessor, the 2007 Employment 
Contract provided that "forfeited deposit[ s] or amounts paid on account of purchase" of the 
Robertsons' land would be shared equally by KLC and Robertsons. 
KLC found a purchaser for the Robertsons' real property, MidAmerican, and in 
September 2007 MidAmerican signed a purchase agreement to buy all the land. (Knipe Ex. 26.) 
showed that there was no colorable dispute over whether KLC's "share of any forfeited deposit 
or amounts paid on account of purchase" did or did not "exceed the commission." 
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That agreement was supplanted the following month by three separate purchase agreements that, 
together, provided for a closing in January 2008. (Knipe Exs. 29, 30, 31.) MidAmerican paid 
$450,000 on account of its intended purchase in three equal payments in September, October, 
and December 2007. Because this money was "nonrefundable," MidAmerican's escrow holder, 
with the agreement of all the parties concerned, disbursed the three payments shortly after each 
was made by MidAmerican, paying 95% of each payment to the Robertsons and 5% to KLC 
(totaling $22,500) as an advance on the 5% commission KLC would be entitled to at the closing. 
(See Knipe Exs. 28, 32, 34.) 
MidAmerican unexpectedly terminated its purchase contracts on January 25,2008. 
(Knipe Ex. 38.) Under' 16 of each of the three land purchase contracts, "SELLER'S 
REMEDIES," the Robertsons could either declare MidAmerican's $450,000 "forfeited," demand 
monetary damages, or demand specific performance. Richard Robertson agreed at trial that the 
Robertsons elected to pursue the first such remedy, regarding the $450,000 as "forfeited." 
Mr. Robertson described the portion of MidAmerican's money that he and his wife reported as 
personal income on their 2007 federal income tax returns as "EARNEST MONEY 
FORFEITED." (Knipe Ex. 43.) 
Mr. Robertson wrote to KLC's agent, Rowena Strain, on February 11,2008, stating that 
he expected to receive the $22,500 previously disbursed to KLC in anticipation of the closing. 
(Robertsons Ex. PP.) This was followed by correspondence between Ms. Strain and John Knipe 
concerning when demand should be made for the balance ofKLC's half of the $450,000 
abandoned by MidAmerican. They decided that in view of the sensitivity of the issue they 
would not bring it up with the Robertsons until after the term of the Employment Contracts had 
been renewed. (Robertsons Ex. QQ.) The Robertsons agreed to extend the Employment 
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Contracts' terms but then terminated them shortly afterward when they received KLC' s demand 
for its share of the forfeited earnest monies. The parties had no further dealings after that, and 
the Robertsons kept all the money they had received on account of the Harmon and 
MidAmerican land purchase agreements. 
After a three-day trial, the jury found that the Robertsons had not breached the 2005 and 
2007 Employment Contracts despite the clear weight of the evidence. With no more justification 
in the evidence or the law, the jury also found that John Knipe had violated the ICP A and 
awarded the $1,000 nominal damages allowed by Idaho Co.de § 48-608(1). The Court then 
entered the Judgment in the form proposed by the Robertsons despite Knipe's objection, 
inexplicably inviting the Robertsons to make new claims under the ICP A. 
III. THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT AS ENTERED IS INCORRECT 
AND MUST BE AMENDED 
Knipe objected to the form of Judgment submitted by the Robertsons and by this 
reference adopts the arguments and authorities stated in that Motion. The Court did not rule on 
Knipe's objections but signed the proposed draft without any changes. Knipe therefore moves 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to amend the Judgment, first to eliminate the 
recitation of the pleadings in its numbered paragraphs 1,2, and 3. Such a narrative is prohibited 
by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) and serves no purpose. All that need be stated is that 
KLC is denied relief, that the Robertsons have judgment against John Knipe for $1,000, and that 
the Court awards costs and attorneys' fees as subsequent proceedings may determine. 
More troublesome is the Judgment's express provision that, notwithstanding the jury's 
verdict after a trial of all of the matters the parties placed in controversy, the Robertsons may 
assert additional claims under the ICPA, and to facilitate that, the Judgment is not "final." Under 
its present wording, the Judgment's finality must await a Rule 54(b) certificate. 
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The Judgment misconstrues Rule 54(b). The purpose of that Rule is to make orders that 
have resolved some, but not all, of the issues in a controversy "final" and thus appealable. See, 
e.g., us. v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 528, 988 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1999). A court should 
not, therefore, enter a judgment "pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b)" to specify that it is not final, as the 
Judgment does on page 3. Instead, a Rule 54(b) certificate of finality should issue only after an 
interlocutory decision resolves some "but less then all of the claims" in a case and an appropriate 
motion has been made showing that "there is no just reason for delay" to make that interlocutory 
decision "final" and thus appealable. See, e.g., Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505, 112 P.3d 
788, 793 (2005). The Judgment's language about its purported lack of finality is therefore ill-
suited to the present circumstances. Moreover, the uncertainty it needlessly creates about the 
finality of the Judgment will inevitably cause problems determining the deadlines for the parties 
to file their post-trial motions under Rules 50(b) and 59(a)(6) and (7), and exercise their right to 
appeal. This language should therefore be deleted. 
The Judgment also grants the Robertsons the opportunity to submit additional claims for 
relief under the ICPA, which they did on or about July 15, 2009. Knipe is unaware of any legal 
authority letting a litigant assert new claims after a trial on the merits. The ICP A was placed in 
controversy by the Robertsons' Counterclaim, but that only alleged that the provisions of the 
Employment Contracts violated the ICP A and those contracts were therefore voidable in their 
entirety, and the Ro bertsons asked for no other relief under the I CP A. 3 
The Robertsons did not move to amend their pleadings before trial and had the fullest 
3 The Counterclaim's Second Count alleged that the $22,500 of MidAmerican's earnest 
money that was paid to KLC had been the subject of "tortious conversion" by KLC and John 
Knipe. The jury denied that claim. 
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opportunity at trial to present all the claims they had under the ICPA. At trial, the Robertsons 
seized on evidence that KLC did not demand its share of the earnest money forfeited by the 
Harmons and MidAmerican until after Defendant Richard Robertson signed agreements on 
February 20,2008, to extend the effective term of the Employment Contracts through the 
following September. But the issue of the renewal of the Employment Contracts had been 
previously dropped from the controversy when KLC was granted leave to file its First Amended 
Complaint, so this evidence had no relevance at trial. After both sides rested, the Robertsons 
made an oral motion under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) to amend their pleadings to 
conform to the evidence, which the Court denied. 
The jury then determined that only John Knipe, not KLC, had violated the ICP A. The 
verdict did not reveal what the jury thought Mr. Knipe had done to violate the statute. However, 
the fact that it rejected the Robertsons' demand for a return of the $22,500 and only awarded the 
statutory minimum of $1 ,000 against Mr. Knipe makes it clear that the jury's sole concern was 
with Mr. Knipe having not demanded the money already owed KLC until after the Robertsons 
extended the terms of the Employment Contracts and that the nominal damages allowed by the 
statute should be all the relief the Robertsons were entitled to under it. Yet, in clear disregard of 
the jury's limited verdict and rulings of the Court, the Judgment grants the Robertsons a new 
opportunity to assert more claims under the ICP A against both KLC and Mr. Knipe. There is no 
justification for this. 
LR.C.P. 54(c) states that "every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." If the trial court grants relief not specifically plead[ ed] 
by the parties, then the issue must be tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties. An issue must be tried by express or 
implied consent in order to give the parties notice and the 
opportunity to present evidence. 
PLAINTIFFITHIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT, FOR NEW TRIAL, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT -10 
Boise-221700.4 0010908- 00008 
O'Connor v. Harger Constr. Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911, 188 P.3d 846, 853 (2008) (citations 
omitted). See also MK Transp., v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980)). 
The Robertsons' claims under the ICPA were fully framed by their pleadings and resolved by the 
jury.4 The mere fact that testimony was introduced at trial about the February 2008 extension 
agreements and the demand KLC made shortly afterward for the money owed to it does not 
mean that the parties had impliedly consented to try the propriety ofthose events as a new cause 
of action. '" Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because 
evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the 
parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue. '" Hughes v. Fisher, LLC, 
142 Idaho 474,483, 129 P.3d 1223, 1232 (2006) (citation omitted). "If a party can show 
prejudice by pointing to evidence it would have otherwise introduced or arguments it would have 
otherwise made, then that party may complain about a district court's finding based on an unpled 
theory." Id. at 484, 129 P.3d at 1233. 
Had Knipe been fairly warned that Mr. Knipe's dealings with the Robertsons after 
MidAmerican terminated its purchase agreement would comprise a separate claim of relief by 
the Robertsons, and was not merely be part of their attack on the credibility of Knipe's two 
witnesses or in support of their affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel, Knipe would have 
provided additional testimony showing that Mr. Robertson hardly deceived but was, instead, 
fully aware of the parties' obligations in February 2008, including, especially, the obligations in 
the very Employment Contracts he signed months before. See also Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 
4 In so arguing, KLC does not concede that John Knipe personally violated the ICPA, that 
his conduct in February 2008 was properly before the jury, or that its determination that he did 
something to violate that statute can stand against KLC's alternative motions for new trial or for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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187, _, 191 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Just as importantly, Knipe would have emphasized that, as a matter of law, the 
Robertsons can have no relief under the ICPA because they had made an election of their 
statutory remedies. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) provides that a consumer who purchases services 
"and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property ... as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by this chapter, 
may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the alternative, may bring an action 
to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars ($1,000") .... " (Emphasis added.) It was 
never disputed that the Robertsons terminated the Employment Contracts as soon as KLC 
demanded half of the forfeited earnest money. Under the ICPA's private right of action, the 
Robertsons could either sue for monetary damages, including the statutory minimum of $1 ,000, 
"or, in the alternative" treat the agreements to extend effective terms of the Employment 
Contracts "voidable" as having been deceitfully induced by Mr. Knipe. Having chosen the latter 
remedy, they cannot now recover the former too. 
Furthermore, the fact that Idaho Code § 48-608(1) would allow a consumer injunctive 
"and any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion may deem just and necessary," 
and that "[t]he court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such 
equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper in cases of repeated or flagrant violations," does 
not mean that such relief was properly placed in controversy or actually tried with the express or 
implied consent of the parties. Idaho Code § 48-608(1) simply allowed the Robertsons to "seek" 
injunctive relief, and they had every opportunity to seek all the relief they wanted at trial. They 
may not now ask the Court to inject new claims or expand the scope of their relief beyond that 
already decided by the jury. The time for that has passed. 
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Although Idaho Code § 48-608(1) grants courts the power to award punitive damages "in 
its discretion," that statute must be read in concert with the comprehensive scope of Idaho Code 
§ 6-1604(2), which specifies that "[i]n all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted," 
punitive damages may not be sought unless the pleadings have first been appropriately amended. 
(Emphasis added.) It is the obligation of the Court to construe disparate statutes so that they are 
in harmony and "to reconcile and give effect to both statutes if at all possible." Callies v. 
o 'Neal, No. 34968, 2009 WL 1929326, at *9 (Idaho July 7,2009); see also Stueve v. N Lights, 
Inc., 118 Idaho 422, 425, 797 P.2d 130, 133 (1990). This can only be done by applying the 
procedural requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1604(2)-demanding that "all" civil actions seeking 
"punitive damages" be the subject of a proper amendment of the pleadings before trial-to the 
evidentiary standard provided by Idaho Code § 48-608(1). The determination in Mac Tools, 
Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193 198, 879 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1994), that Idaho Code § 48-608(1) 
created a new kind of punitive damages award to "remedy for repeated and flagrant violations of 
the ICP A" is not inconsistent with the requirement that such a potentially devastating issue be 
placed in controversy in the same orderly fashion that common law punitive damages must be, 
rather than being sprung on an unsuspecting defendant after the close of evidence and the entry 
of the verdict. 5 
In summary, the Court is without power to perpetuate this litigation for the Robertsons' 
benefit. All of the matters tried with the express and implicit agreement of the parties have 
5 Mac Tools expressly declined to decide whether the punitive damages allowed by Idaho 
Code § 48-608(1) should be the province of the jury or the judge (126 Idaho at 198, 879 P.2d at 
1131) so it is not at all certain whether the Court may now unilaterally exercise its "discretion" to 
award punitive damages at this late stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, the Robertsons made 
no effort to amend their pleadings to allege, nor did they produce any evidence at trial to show, 
that any violation ofthe ICPA by John Knipe was "repeated and flagrant." 
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resulted in a verdict that fully concluded the controversy. The failure of the Robertsons to 
properly amend their pleadings before trial, and the express denial of their motion to do so to 
conform to the evidence at the end of the trial, closes the door to continued litigation of the sort 
ostensibly still allowed by the Judgment. It must now, therefore, be amended to exclude such 
opportunity for additional relief. 
IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT, 
AND A NEW TRIAL IS JUSTIFIED UNDER RULE 59(a)(6) 
Knipe alternatively moves for new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), 
because there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict or was otherwise against the law. 
To decide a motion made under that rule "the trial judge must 'weigh the evidence and determine 
(1) whether the verdict is against his or her view ofthe clear weight of the evidence; and (2) 
whether a new trial would produce a different result. '" Harger v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting, 
LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 719, 184 P.3d 841,844 (2008) (citation omitted). Unlike Knipe's 
alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b), the Court may 
grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) where "the trial judge ... has weighed all the evidence, 
including his own determination of the credibility of the witnesses ... [and] concludes that the 
verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." Quick v. Crane, 
111 Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). The Court is not required to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Robertsons in such an analysis, and may grant a new trial even 
if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id. at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. 
This case is unusual for how closely the factual testimony offered by both sides agreed. 
There was no factual dispute about what documents were signed or about what each document 
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said. There was no dispute over who paid how much money to whom or when. Fairly 
considered, the only area where the testimony of the parties parted company was over their 
opinions of what the written terms of the Employment Contracts meant. 6 Therefore, looking to 
the evidence dealing with whether the Robertsons had breached either Employment Contract, the 
Court must focus on the Employment Contracts' provision that "[s]hould a deposit or amounts 
paid on account of purchase be forfeited, one half thereof may be retained by you [KLC], as the 
broker, as the balance shall be paid to me [the Robertsons]." 
There was no dispute that the Harmons paid $35,000 in nonrefundable earnest money that 
was disbursed to the Robertsons before the Harmons withdrew from their purchase agreement 
and was kept by the Robertsons afterward. It was similarly agreed (1) that MidAmerican paid 
$450,000 in nonrefundable earnest money, 95% of which was disbursed to the Robertsons and 
5% of which was paid to KLC before MidAmerican terminated its purchase agreements, and (2) 
that, after MidAmerican refused to close, the Robertsons kept all of the money they had received. 
Most significantly, Mr. Robertson agreed during cross-examination that the monies paid 
by the Harmons and MidAmerican were "deposit[ s] or amounts paid on account of purchase" of 
the Robertsons' land. He also agreed that when they terminated their respective land purchase 
contracts with Robertsons, the Harmons and MidAmerican lost any right to or benefit of the 
nonrefundable monies they had previously paid in that connection. Mr. Robertson admitted that 
the Robertsons kept all this money and refused to share it with KLC. Mr. Robertson agreed that 
the remedy the Robertsons had exercised under the "Sellers' Remedies" available to them under 
6 The Court may set aside, for the moment, evidence concerning when Knipe finally 
demanded half the forfeited earnest money, which was relevant only to the Robertsons' 
affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel. Because the jury decided that neither Employment 
Contract had been breached, it never considered that affirmative defense. 
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their land purchase contracts with MidAmerican was to deem the monies previously paid by 
MidAmerican "forfeited." (See ~ 16 of Knipe Exs. 29, 30, 31.) Mr. Robertson agreed that he 
and his wife described the share of MidAmerican' s money that they reported as their personal 
income on their 2007 income tax returns as "EARNEST MONEY FORFEITED." (Knipe Ex. 
43.) 
The Robertsons therefore admitted all the elements of Knipe's case alleging a breach of 
the Employment Contracts. The only testimony they produced to evade what should have been 
certain liability consisted of the subjective opinion of Mr. Robertson about what the word 
"forfeited" meant in the Employment Contract he signed, and the subjective opinion of an 
employee of MidAmerican, Cindy Crane, about whether MidAmerican had "breached" its own 
separate contracts with Robertsons. For his part, Mr. Robertson opined that neither prospective 
purchaser had "forfeited" any money because neither had "breached" their purchase agreement 
with the Robertsons. Mr. Robertson did not explain exactly what this was supposed to mean, nor 
did he say that it was founded on anything more than a "feeling" he had about what the word 
"forfeited" meant. He admitted he did not disclose his personal interpretation of the word's 
meaning to anyone even though he said he read both Employment Contracts before signing 
them. Of course, neither Employment Contract says anything about an eventual purchaser ofthe 
Robertsons' land having to "breach" a future, hypothetical land purchase contract of his own 
before KLC and the Robertsons could consider a down payment lost by such a buyer as a 
consequence of his refusal to close, as having been been "forfeited." 
"Forfeited" is a perfectly ordinary word that does not need "interpretation." The Court 
explicitly recognized that when it sustained Knipe's objection to the Robertsons' attempted 
cross-examination of John Knipe with a dictionary and then denied the Robertsons' request to 
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admit the dictionary in evidence. The courts merely echo the ordinary meaning attached to the 
word "forfeited." "In the context of a land sale contract, forfeiture means that if a purchaser 
defaults on the payments, any sums paid by the purchaser on the contract of sale are not 
reimbursed to him or her." Crowley v. McCoy, 449 N.W.2d 221, 224-25 (Neb. 1989). "The 
term 'forfeited' in its usually accepted meaning as applied to rights to property is that they are 
taken away, or lost." Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah 1971). 
Ms. Crane knew nothing about the Employment Contracts. Instead, she opined that 
MidAmerican had not "breached" the land purchase agreements it signed with Robertsons and 
therefore had not "forfeited" the $450,000 it paid under the terms of those contracts-even 
though she also conceded that MidAmerican had expressly relinquished any claim to that money 
in its January 25,2008 letter to the Robertsons, terminating its contracts: "In accordance with 
the [October 2007] Agreements, MNEC acknowledges your right to retain the earnest money 
amounts already deposited under each Agreement, totaling $450,000, as your sale and exclusive 
remedy for this determination." (Knipe Ex. 38 (emphasis added).) Ms. Crane attempted to 
explain away this reality by claiming that the $450,000 had "really" been paid to the Robertsons 
solely to allow MidAmerican to go onto their property and conduct surveys and examinations to 
determine whether it wanted to proceed with the purchase. Of course, Ms. Crane admitted that 
no such provision appeared in any of the MidAmerican purchase contracts. To the contrary, she 
agreed that ~ 16 of the MidAmerican contracts provided that the earnest money would be 
"forfeited" if MidAmerican "refuses or neglects to consummate the transaction within the time 
period" agreed to, and that MidAmerican did not, in fact, "consummate the transaction" by the 
specified deadline. In any event, what Ms. Crane personally believes the MidAmerican contracts 
(none of which were contended to be ambiguous) entailed as far as MidAmerican and the 
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Robertsons were concerned is utterly irrelevant to understanding and applying the provisions of 
the separate Employment Contracts that were entered into months before either Knipe or the 
Robertsons even knew a company like MidAmerican would want to buy the Robertsons' land. 
The proposition that prospective purchasers who paid tens and hundreds ofthousands of 
dollars to the Robertsons, which money would have reduced the prices they agreed to pay for the 
Robertsons' land, but who lost any right to recover that money or have anything else to show for 
it as a consequence of terminating their respective deals, did not "forfeit" those monies defies 
common sense and plain English. Even more dubious is the Robertsons', and apparently 
Ms. Crane's, position that KLC originally intended that KLC would not be able to prove that its 
own Employment Contracts had been breached unless itjirst proved that separate contracts 
entered into by the Robertsons and third parties for fundamentally different purposes had been 
"breached" in some undefined way. 7 
Finally, there is the issue of the jury's finding that Mr. Knipe did something that to 
violate the ICPA and should pay the $1,000 in nominal damages allowed by Idaho Code 
§ 48-608(1). As discussed above, the testimony concerning the February 2008 agreement to 
extend the effective term ofthe Employment Contracts could not have been regarded as 
something that would support a claim for relief, in and of itself. Such a claim was not alleged in 
the pleadings, nor was it properly brought to the parties' attention and tried with their implicit 
7 In denying the Robertsons' second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment claiming that 
that the Employment Contracts had been "merged" into MidAmerican's October 2007 land 
purchase contracts, the Court found that, "[m]ost significantly, the contracts do not concern the 
same fundamental subject matter. While it is true that they both deal with the sale of property 
and earnest money, the employment contracts delineate the underlying contractual relationship 
and obligations between the Defendants sellers and Plaintiff, their agent, while the Purchase and 
Sale Agreements set forth specific terms of the specific sale between the unnamed purchaser 
[MidAmerican] and the sellers [Robertson]." (Order on Motions, entered June 9, 2009, at 4.) 
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agreement. In addition, the relief granted is legally unavailable because the Robertsons elected 
the statutory remedies available to them under the ICP A when they chose to treat the 
Employment Contracts and the February 2008 agreements to extend their terms as voidable 
when Knipe demanded its due. 
Finally, it would be a strange moral reversal, indeed, if a person who is owed money by 
another should be considered to have acted "deceitfully" by not asserting his legal right to that 
money as soon as it became due. How can an individual like Mr. Robertson have been 
wrongfully "deceived" about the existence of his own debt to another, when he read and signed 
the Employment Contracts that gave rise to that very obligation in the first place? Sharp 
business practices that are the concern of the ICPA are one thing, but delaying a legitimate 
demand for money already owed, because of a perfectly reasonable apprehension that the obligor 
will be aggravated to be reminded of his debt, is not such a practice. 
It is frankly impossible to look at such uncontradicted testimony and conclude that the 
Robertsons did not breach the Employment Contracts. As will later be argued in more detail, 
this evidence justifies the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but it is decisive for 
the purposes of Knipe's request for a new trial. 
V. ERRORS OF LAW AT TRIAL JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59(a)(7) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(7) states a district 
court may grant a new trial for an "error of law, occurring at the 
trial." The district judge is vested with wide discretion to grant or 
deny a new trial where substantial rights of the aggrieved party are 
not affected and that party is not entitled to a new trial as a matter 
of right. Where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, however, 
the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under Rule 
59(a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800-01, 134 P.3d 
648, 651-52 (2006) (citation omitted); see also Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 261, 805 
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P.2d 452, 467 (1991); Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 381, 3 P.3d 56,59 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Substantial errors of law prejudiced Knipe's rights and require a new trial. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Court declined to decide whether the 
Employment Contracts were ambiguous. Instead, Instruction No. 11 told the jury, over Knipe's 
objection, that the provision in the Employment Contracts stating that forfeited earnest monies 
would be shared by KLC and the Robertsons was "in dispute," and left it to the jury to determine 
what was "intended by the parties" by weighing not only the language ofthe Employment 
Contracts but also the circumstances that gave rise to them, the parties' communications, and 
their conduct and dealings. Instruction No. 12 told the jury not to ignore the plain and ordinary 
meaning of a written agreement but also allowed it to consider extrinsic evidence and testimony 
presented at trial to clarify ambiguities. Instruction No. 13 further invited the jury to consider 
extrinsic evidence and also instructed it to construe ambiguous contract terms against the party 
drafting it if the jurors could not determine the parties' original intent from the extrinsic evidence 
heard at trial. 
The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is the sole responsibility of the 
courttodecideasamatteroflaw. Cannonv. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170P.3d393,396 
(2007). Only if a court first finds that an agreement is ambiguous should it ask the jury as the 
trier of fact to determine the parties' mutual intent by considering extrinsic evidence. 
Farnsworth v. Dairyman's Creamery Ass 'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 
1994); Sf. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579,581 (1989); Bauchman-Kingston 
P'ship, LP v. Haroldsen, No. 34551,2008 WL 5133788, at *2 (Idaho Dec. 8,2008). If the court 
decides that the wording in controversy is unambiguous, it should then go on and apply the 
contract as a matter oflaw, and not leave that to the jury. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 
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524,527, 181 P.3d 450,453 (2008). 
Erroneous instructions do not generally justify a new trial, "unless the appellant can 
establish that he or she was prejudiced thereby, and that the error affected the jury's 
conclusions." Sherwood, 119 Idaho at 260,805 P.2d at 466. Knipe was unquestionably 
prejudiced by these Instructions which, considered as a whole, told the jury it could make 
whatever it wanted to of the Employment Contracts' language. Given the verdict, it is unrealistic 
to suppose that the jury did not accept Mr. Robertson's personal interpretation of the ordinary 
word "forfeited" and give unwarranted weight to Ms. Crane's personal interpretation of her 
employer's contracts-in spite of the explicit admission that all the factual prerequisites needed 
to grant KLC judgment had been satisfied by uncontradicted evidence and testimony. The Court 
should have determined that the Employment Contracts were unambiguous and given the jury 
Knipe's requested Instruction No. 15, but it declined to do so. 
Beyond the issue of the Instructions, however, the Court failed to fulfill its initial 
responsibility to determine whether the Employment Contracts were ambiguous. That alone 
justifies a new trial. 
The Court instructed the jury in its opening Instruction No.4 that KLC received a "5% 
commission" from the three disbursements of money paid by MidAmerican, as a fact the parties 
were in agreement with. To the contrary, the Stipulation filed by the parties did not characterize 
those payments in that way, but only told the jury that the parties were agreed that of the 
disbursements of Mid American's earnest money, $22,500 had been paid to KLC and the rest to 
the Robertsons. This was not a small distinction, because the Robertsons consistently claimed 
that the "Ellsworth Dobbs rule" prohibited KLC from being entitled to anything under its 
Employment Contracts because there had not been an actual sale of the Robertsons' land to 
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MidAmerican. Branding the $22,500 as a "commission" therefore set the stage for the 
Robertsons to argue that KLC had no entitlement to that money and should give it to the 
Robertsons. As the Court will recall, Knipe's objection to this opening Instruction before 
evidence began was renewed at the beginning of the second day of trial, and the Court then 
granted it and asked Knipe to prepare a corrective Instruction. However, at the following 
midmorning recess, the Court said it would stick with its original Instruction after all because the 
testimony of Ms. Strain it had heard so far was consistent with what had originally been read to 
the jury. Thus, the jury was initially told that the parties had agreed to facts that the parties had 
not agreed to. When an objection was made, the Court ultimately made what was, in practical 
and legal effect, a judgment on a question of fact. Instead, the Court should have given Knipe's 
proposed opening Instruction No.5, which faithfully quoted the parties' StipUlation of 
undisputed facts. 
The Court also improperly submitted the Robertsons' affirmative defense of waiver by 
estoppel to the jury by its Instruction No. 16. "The doctrine of implied waiver by silence is 
disfavored" in Idaho. Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 
(Ct. App. 1987). Waiver will not be inferred, and the intent to waive must clearly appear from 
the evidence. Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256,846 P.2d 904,907 
(1993). "A court first must determine whether the facts alleged to constitute waiver are true. 
The court then must decide whether these facts, as a matter oflaw, suffice to show waiver." 
Soloaga v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 678, 682, 809 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations 
omitted). The affirmative defense of waiver by estoppel must also include a showing that the 
party asserting this affirmative defense reasonably relied on his opponent's conduct and that he 
"'thereby ... altered his position to his detriment. '" Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 
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136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006) (citation omitted). 
The only evidence produced at trial to support this affirmative defense was the silence 
that prevailed between the parties after the Harmons terminated their land purchase agreement 
and lost the $35,000 in nonrefundable earnest money they had paid. The "detriment" that the 
Robertsons claim to have suffered by assuming, on the basis of that silence alone, that KLC 
would never enforce the express provisions of the Employment Contracts entitling it to half of 
the forfeited earnest money was, improbably, their use of that money to pay their debts and buy 
new pickup trucks-which is no hardship and is certainly not giving up what one previously had 
a right to keep. 8 The issue ofthis affirmative defense should therefore have never been 
submitted to the jury. This is not an entirely academic point, even though the jury never decided 
whether the Robertsons had proven this affirmative defense because it decided that the 
Employment Contracts had not been breached in the first place. To the contrary, this was 
another prejudicial Instruction, reinforcing the invitation to the jury to ignore the plain English of 
the Employment Contracts in favor of extrinsic evidence and the Robertsons' witnesses' 
subjective opinions. 
Next, the Court incorrectly allowed Cindy Crane to testify. Knipe filed a Motion in 
Limine prior to trial asking that her testimony be excluded, but the Court denied that Motion as it 
denied motions to exclude or limit her testimony at trial. That prior Motion pointed out that 
Knipe had served Interrogatories on the Robertsons asking them to identify everyone they 
8 "Legal detriment means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the 
promisee was privileged to retain, or doing or refraining from doing something which he was 
then privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing." Hinckley v. Nynex Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 
143 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Detriment means giving up 
something which immediately prior thereto the promisee was privileged to keep." Worley v. 
Wyo. Bottling Co., 1 P.3d 615,622 (Wyo. 2000). 
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thought had relevant knowledge and to disclose what they believed that knowledge to be. The 
Robertsons identified Ms. Crane by name but refused to say what they thought she knew about 
the controversy. Ms. Crane's name did not come up in any other pretrial discovery, and there 
was no apparent reason to take her deposition. When the Robertsons announced shortly before 
trial that they would call her as a witness, Knipe moved under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26( e)( 4) to exclude her testimony, but that motion was denied, apparently on the grounds that the 
Robertsons' needed only to name her and it was up to their opponents to do the rest. Such a 
stance effectively neuters Rule 33 and renders it something litigants may honor or ignore as they 
please. 
It is generally within the trial court's discretion to sanction parties for violations of the 
discovery rules. In doing so, the court should impose a sanction that is proportionate to the 
offense and serves the dual purposes of encouraging compliance with discovery and punishing 
misconduct. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663,667,668,931 P.2d 657, 661, 662 (App. 1996). In this 
case, the Robertsons cavalierly ignored a question fairly put to them, capitalized at trial on their 
refusal to answer, and suffered no consequences of any sort. At the very least, Ms. Crane should 
not be allowed to testify. Such a sanction should, objectively considered, not have been a great 
penalty since all she had to testify about was her personal opinions about contracts that were 
separate from the contracts between the parties that were actually in controversy. 
Having been allowed to testify, the irrelevance of Ms. Crane's opinion permitted 
testimony, which Knipe objected to because it was just that, her subjective opinion unsupported 
by anything actually written in the MidAmerican land purchase contracts, remains a significant 
error of law. Moreover, those MidAmerican contracts were not claimed to be ambiguous and 
thus were not in need of interpretation by a witness for any purpose. Such testimony, by a 
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purportedly disinterested witness, only reinforced Mr. Robertson's testimony about what he 
"felt" the word "forfeited" meant, all at the expense of the plain language of the Employment 
Contracts themselves and all to the prejudice of Knipe. 
Next, the Court permitted the Robertsons' attorney to cross-examine Rowena Strain and 
John Knipe about what Idaho Code § 54-2051 required to be in agreements like the 
MidAmerican land purchase contracts. When the Court instructed counsel to refrain from 
reading that statute to the jury during closing argument, counsel ostentatiously laid his copy of 
the statute on his desk and read from it. This, of course, goes back to what had been the 
centerpiece of the Robertsons' defense, the argument that Idaho Code §§ 54-2050 and 54-2051 
rendered the Employment Contracts void and unenforceable as a matter of law. The Court 
rejected those arguments when it granted Knipe partial summary judgment on February 12, 
2009, and again when it denied the Robertsons' second motion for summary judgment and their 
motion for reconsideration on June 9, 2009. In any event, the matter can no longer be in dispute 
in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Callies, which conclusively found that the 
statutes the Robertsons had relied on for so long were regulatory matters for the Idaho Real 
Estate Commission to enforce and have no relevance to contract disputes such as this one. (See 
Callies, 2009 WL 1929326, at *9 n.7.) The Robertsons' use of those statutes to elicit facially 
damaging testimony about what should have been in the MidAmerican land contracts concerning 
the division of forfeited earnest monies, but was not, should not have been permitted, and it 
could not have helped but substantially prejUdice Knipe at trial. 
The Court erred by giving Instruction No. 15, which required Knipe to prove that "a 
contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants." The Court had determined in its Order of 
February 12,2009, that the Employment Contracts were "valid" and suffered from no legal 
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deficiency. That finding was reiterated in the Court's June 9, 2009 Order. Although the jury 
presumably found that there were contracts between the parties (otherwise it would not have 
found that the Robertsons did not breach them), this Instruction incorrectly telling the jury that 
Knipe had to shoulder the burden of yet another item of proof added to the accumulating burden 
of prejudice to its case. The Court should have instead given Knipe's requested Instruction 
Nos. 7 and 12, advising the jury only what the Court had already determined: that the 
Employment Contracts were valid and suffered from no legal deficiency as a matter oflaw.9 
Instruction No. 15 was further deficient in instructing the jury that Knipe had the burden 
of proving "the amount of the damages." But the "amount" of damages sought by Knipe was 
never in controversy. It sought one-half of the Harmons' forfeited $35,000 and one-half of the 
$450,000 forfeited by MidArnerican, minus the $22,500 paid to KLC before January 25,2008. 
There was no need to include this issue in the Instructions, and the Court should have instead 
given Knipe's requested Instruction No. 20, setting forth these amounts. 
Neither should the Court have given Instruction No. 20 allowing the jury to find 
violations of the ICP A, but which omitted to mention Idaho Code § 48-603' s requirement that 
any violation of the ICPA had to be committed knowingly. For that matter, the Instruction 
should have never been given at all because there was no evidence to imply any deceitful 
conduct by KLC or John Knipe at any time before February 2008. Indeed, Richard Robertson 
testified that he was pleased with everything KLC had done up to that time. The only 
conceivable circumstance that might support a claim of unfair dealing was the timing ofKLC's 
demand for the money it was entitled to, and, as demonstrated above, that issue was not properly 
9 An instruction that the Employment Contracts suffered from "no legal deficiency" 
would have also been important to offset the Robertsons' improper exploitation of Idaho Code 
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before the Court. It had not been properly raised by the Robertsons in their pleadings or the 
course of the trial. It concerned events that were irrelevant to the controversy the parties finally 
brought to trial, and was unavailable to the Robertsons due to their election of the remedies 
available to consumers under Idaho Code § 48-608(1). 
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 48-60 5( 1) provides that nothing in the ICP A shall apply to 
actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by any regulatory body of the state of 
Idaho. To the extent John Knipe acted unprofessionally, his actions were the concern of the 
Idaho Real Estate Commission, and thus not subject to the ICPA. (See Callies, 2009 WL 
1929326, at *9 n.7.) 
Taken as a whole, the Court's Instructions severely prejudiced Knipe. That unfair 
disadvantage was exacerbated by the decision to allow testimony by a witness whose importance 
had been deliberately concealed from Knipe, and who, moreover, only testified about her 
subjective opinions about contracts that were not directly in controversy. Knipe was further 
prejudiced by the Robertsons' improper exploitation of Idaho Code § 54-2051 to elicit ostensibly 
damaging testimony that the Robertsons then capitalized on at closing argument. Finally, there 
was the Court's failure to decide whether the Employment Contracts were ambiguous and to 
either interpret the Employment Contracts itself if they were not ambiguous or correctly instruct 
the jury if they were. Taken as a whole, and particularly when combined with the insufficiencies 
of the factual evidence previously discussed, these errors of law more than justify a new trial on 
all issues. 
§ 54-2051. 
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VI. KNIPE SHOULD BE GRANTED JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT UNDER RULE 50(B) 
The issue to be determined on a motion for j.n.o.v. is whether 
substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Substantial 
evidence does not require that the evidence be uncontradicted. 
Rather, the evidence need only be of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the 
verdict of the jury was proper. Upon a motion for j.n.o.v., the 
moving party admits the truth of all adverse evidence and all 
inferences that can legitimately be drawn from it. In ruling on a 
motion for j.n.o.v, the trial court cannot weigh the evidence, assess 
the credibility of the witnesses, or make its own factual findings 
and compare them to those of the jury. The trial court draws all 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. The motion should be 
granted only where there can be but one conclusion as to the 
verdict that reasonable minds could have reached and when that 
conclusion does not conform to the jury verdict. The function of a 
j.n.o.v. is to give the trial court the last opportunity to order the 
judgment that the law requires. 
Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, _,200 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations 
omitted); see also Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, _, 203 P .3d 702, 706 (2009); Quick, 111 
Idaho at 763-64, 727 P.2d at 1191-92; Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943 
P.2d 912,921 (1997). This is a demanding standard, and it should be. However, as noted above, 
this case is unusual for the extent to which the parties are in agreement over the relevant facts 
and dispositions the Court to grant the relief Knipe now seeks. 
Callies has now made it crystal clear that none of the legal defenses the Robertsons 
depended upon to invalidate the Employment Contracts apply. Notwithstanding Mr. Robertson's 
"feeling" about the meaning of the word "forfeited" and Ms. Crane's subjective interpretation of 
unambiguous land purchase contracts her employer did not even draft until long after the 
Employment Contracts were executed by the parties to this litigation, the Court must 
acknowledge that the crucial sentence in the Employment Contracts speaks in plain English that 
does not admit to, or need, any reference to extrinsic evidence to be understood by a reasonable 
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layperson. When a contract speaks with such clarity, it is up to the Court, not the jury, to enforce 
it as a matter oflaw. Jorgensen, 145 Idaho at 527, 181 P.3d at 453. 
An agreement is "ambiguous" only when its words may be "reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation." Blondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992). It 
is clearly reasonable to read the sentence in controversy and apply it as Knipe contends to the 
monies the Harmons and MidAmerican paid on account of their land purchase contracts. 
However, it is impossible to conceive of what a reasonable alternative interpretation of that 
language might be. "Ambiguity results with reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to 
... [a document's] ... meaning, however ambiguity is not established merely because different 
possible interpretations are presented to the court." McKay v. Boise Project Bd Of Control, 141 
Idaho 463, 469, 470, 111 P.3d 148, 154, 155 (2005). A litigant's proposal of an interpretation 
that it is frankly unreasonable cannot indicate the existence of ambiguity. Baker v. Farm Bureau 
Mut.lns. Co., 103 Idaho 415, 418, 941 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Ct. App. 1997). See also Aerel S.R.L. v. 
p.ee Airfoils, LLC, 448 F.2d 899,904 (6th Cir. 2006); Frulla v. CRA Holdings, 543 F.3d 1247, 
1252 (lith Cir. 2008) ("If the interpretation urged by one party is unreasonable in light of the 
contracts' plain language, the contract is not ambiguous, and the court may not use extrinsic 
evidence to vary the terms of the contract."). As discussed above, it is wholly illogical to think 
that KLC and the Robertsons originally intended that KLC's eventual entitlement to a share of 
forfeited earnest monies would have to depend upon KLC first proving a "breach" of third-party 
contracts that had yet to be written and signed by buyers who had yet to be found when each 
Employment Contract was entered into. If there is a reasonable alternative interpretation ofthe 
sentence in question, the Robertsons have not described it. 
The Court cannot ignore Mr. Robertson's unqualified agreement that the Harmons' and 
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MidAmerican's money was paid as a "deposit or on account" of the purchase of the Robertsons' 
land, that when their respective land purchase agreements were terminated they lost any right to 
or benefit of that money, and that when MidAmerican withdrew from its agreements, the remedy 
the Robertsons chose under their contracts with that corporation was to deem the $450,000 
"forfeited." And if that were not enough, there is the Robertsons' representation to the United 
States government on their 2007 income tax return that the monies they thus obtained were 
"EARNEST MONEY FORFEITED." 
The factual evidence adduced at trial, applied under the correct legal standard, leads to no 
other reasonable conclusion but that the Robertsons breached the Employment Contracts and are 
now obligated to share with KLC the money paid by the Harmons and MidAmerican. The only 
affirmative defense that might then be recalled to duty is waiver by estoppel. However, as 
discussed above, the factual evidence adduced at trial cannot support such an affirmative 
defense. First, it depended solely upon silence, and sustaining such a defense on that basis alone 
is disfavored in Idaho. The indispensable criteria of this affirmative defense also required the 
Robertsons to show that they reasonably relied on the silence and, additionally, acted to their 
detriment as a result. While it may be human nature to hope that a creditor's silence means that 
the creditor has just forgotten one's debt, that cannot comprise the kind of affirmative conduct by 
a creditor that clearly implies a knowing and intentional waiver of a valuable legal right. See 
Seaport Citizens Bank, 112 Idaho at 739, 735 P.2d at 1050. 
It is even more illogical to argue that debtors acted to their "detriment" when they used 
the money that should have been voluntarily paid to their quiet creditor to instead payoff a 
mortgage on their land and buy new automobiles. Knipe has been unable to find any reported 
case that even discusses such a patently unreasonable argument, let alone supports it. 
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Finally, there is the jury's verdict that John Knipe violated the ICP A. As discussed 
above, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that the jury was 
offended by Mr. Knipe waiting to demand that the Robertsons pay their debts until after the 
Employment Contracts had been renewed. However, those events, which were confined to a few 
days in February 2008, were irrelevant to the claims the respective parties finally brought into 
the courtroom for trial. The Robertsons elected their statutory remedies under Idaho Code 
§ 48-608(1) When they terminated the Employment Contracts after demand for the forfeited 
earnest monies was made on February 19,2008. Mr. Knipe's conduct as a licensed rea1.estate 
agent is the concern of the Idaho Real Estate Commission, as provided by Idaho Code § 48-605. 
(ej Callies, 2009 WL 1929326, at *9 n.7.) And careful consideration must be given to the very 
idea that a person could be found to have knowingly committed an "unfair or deceptive act[] ... 
in the conduct of' his trade by refraining from immediately asking his debtor to do something 
that debtor should have voluntarily done anyway. Actions such as that are not what the ICPA 
has in mind, no matter how broadly its remedial intent should be implemented. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Objectively considered, there has never been much, if any, dispute over the facts bearing 
on this case. That, of course, is why the Robertsons strove so consistently to render the 
Employment Contracts void on purely statutory grounds, an effort that the Court determined 
before trial, and Callies has now confirmed, was misplaced. Unfortunately, the legal certainty 
achieved beforehand did not carry through the trial. Thus, the Robertsons were allowed to cross-
examine Knipe's witnesses about statutes (Idaho Code § 54-2051) that the Court had already 
determined had no application to the present controversy. They were allowed to explain and 
interpret a perfectly clear sentence in the Employment Contracts to argue, with obvious success, 
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that it did not mean what it said but instead meant what Mr. Robertson privately "felt" it did. 
They were allowed to explain to the jury that the terms and implementation of MidAmerican 
contracts that the Court had previously determined were fundamentally distinct from the 
Employment Contracts nevertheless controlled the meaning and enforcement of those 
Employment Contracts, both of which had been signed long before the MidAmerican contracts 
were even written. 
The uncertainty and confusion engendered by these inconsistencies, compounded by the 
Instructions discussed above, at the very least require a new trial on all issues. Indeed, Knipe 
believes that once the irrelevant, subjective opinions of Mr. Robertson and Ms. Crane are peeled 
away, the admitted evidence that remains leads to only one reasonable conclusion: that 
judgment should now be entered in Knipe's favor notwithstanding the verdict. 
DATED: July 23 2009. 
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Plaintiff Knipe Land Company and Third Party Defendant John Knipe hereby submit this 
opposition to Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 7,2009, the Court entered Judgment in this case, dismissing Knipe Land 
Company's ("KLC") Complaint against Richard Robertson and Johnnie Robertson, and 
Robertson Kennels (collectively "the Robertsons"). The Judgment determined that only Third 
Party Defendant John Knipe violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Idaho Code § 48-608) 
(the "ICPA") and rendered judgment against him in the nominal amount allowed by Idaho Code 
§ 48-608(1)-$1,000-even though the Robertsons had claimed that both KLC and John Knipe 
had violated that statute. Finally, the Judgment dismissed the claim the Robertsons had asserted 
only against John Knipe for the tortious conversion of $22,500 previously paid to KLC with the 
Robertsons' agreement. 
On July 13,2009, the Robertsons filed a Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees ("Motion") 
supported by a Memorandum and Affidavits of counsel, Derek Pica and Robert Wetherell, 
asserting they are entitled to $110,307.50 in attorneys' fees and $3,533.34 in costs as a matter of 
right and as discretionary costs. These claims are, however, umeasonable and excessive, and fail 
to acknowledge the distinct and separate claims in this litigation that they did not prevail on or 
achieved only minimal success on. Therefore, KLC requests that the Court deny the Robertsons' 
Motion, in whole or in part. Alternatively, KLC asks the Court to significantly reduce the 
Robertsons' request. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This litigation arose from a dispute over money due pursuant to two Employment 
Contracts. 1 KLC alleged that it was owed one-half of all earnest monies paid but later forfeited 
by two third-party purchasers of land the Robertsons had listed for sale with KLC as their 
exclusive broker. The Robertsons denied that such monies were owed and asserted a 
Counterclaim. COUflt One of their Counterclaim named not only KLC, but also KLC's president, 
John Knipe, as a third party defendant, alleging that these two parties had breached the ICPA, 
without discriminating between the two. That Count alleged two specific violations of the ICPA, 
(Idaho Code § 48-603(12) and (13), both of which were disproved at trial), deceptive practices 
regarding "entering into" the 2005 and 2007 Employment Contracts, and "unconscionable 
methods, acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce" which were not described in any 
more detail. The Counterclaim's Count Two claimed that John Knipe, as an individual, had 
"wrongfully converted" the $22,500 disbursed from earnest monies paid by the second purchaser 
of the Robertsons' land. 
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were decided on February 12,2009, the Court 
rejecting the legal centerpiece ofthe Robertsons' defense to KLC's claims: that portions of the 
Idaho Real Estate License Law, Idaho Code §§ 54-2050 and 54-2051, rendered both 
Employment Contracts void and Uflenforceable as a matter of law. The Court held" ... that 
both 'employment contracts' between Knipe Land and the Robertsons were valid and suffer from 
no legal deficiency. The balance of the issues and claims of both parties fundamentally go to a 
course of conduct, which are issues for the jury." Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, 
1 For a complete recitation ofthe facts, see Memorandum in Support of Knipe Land 
Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 17,2008. 
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February 12,2009, at 2. Despite this clear statement of the law and the lack of any new evidence 
or newly decided law, the Robertsons invested still more attorneys' fees researching and drafting 
two new Motions for Summary Judgment and for Reconsideration on March 30, 2009, arguing 
that land purchase contracts the Robertsons signed with a third party for the actual purchase of 
their land somehow "merged" the separate Employment Contracts (executed months before) into 
these land purchase contracts, rendering the Employment Contracts void. On June 9, 2009, the 
Court determined that "[t]here is no new evidence before the Court" and denied both Motions. 
The Court then held, for the second time, that the Idaho Real Estate Licensing Law provisions 
the Robertsons portrayed as the "statute of frauds" applicable to the present dispute were 
inapplicable to the present dispute? (Order on Motions, June 9,2009, at 4, 5.) 
After a three-day trial, the jury determined that the Robertsons had not breached the 
Employment Contracts and that John Knipe, but not KLC, had violated the ICP A, awarding the 
$1,000 in nominal damages allowed by Idaho Code § 48-608(1). The jury found the $22,500 
had not been tortiously converted. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Because the Robertsons were only partially successful in this litigation, KLC and John 
Knipe request that the Court decline to award any attorneys' fees or costs. In the alternative, 
KLC and John Knipe request that the Court acknowledge the separate claims the jury decided 
and apportion and separately determine the reasonable amounts of attorneys' fees, if any, the 
2 Undeterred, the Robertsons continued to assert the Licensing Law in their trial brief and 
were allowed to exploit Idaho Code § 54-2051 at trial despite the Court's prior rulings. The 
inapplicability of the Licensing Law to private controversies such as the one at bar has been 
confirmed by Callies v. O'Neal, No. 34968, 2009 WL 1929326 (Idaho July 7,2009). 
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Robertsons may be entitled to in connection with each one. To the extent that the Court awards 
fees and costs, the amounts sought by the Robertsons must be significantly reduced. 
A. The Court Should Decline to Award Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
Pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54( e)( 1), "the court may award reasonable attorney fees ... 
to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute 
or contract." Determination of prevailing parties is committed to the trial court's discretion. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLCv. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117P.3d 
130, 132-33 (2005). Rule 54(d)(l)(B) guides courts' inquiries on the prevailing party question. 
Id. at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. That Rule provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider 
the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound 
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the 
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). When both parties are partially successful, however, it is within 
the court's discretion to decline an award of attorneys' fees to either side. Israel v. Leachman, 
139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864,867 (2003).3 
3 In their Motion, the Robertsons argue that they should be entitled to the entirety of their 
fees and costs even though they failed to prevail in their claim for conversion, citing Shore 
v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1115 (2009). In Shore, the Robertsons argue, 
the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision that the defendant was not a prevailing party 
because he failed to recover on his defense claim of conversion. The Robertsons, however, omit 
mention of critical facts that distinguish that case from the case at hand. In Shore, the defendant 
asserted conversion in the alternative to his accord and satisfaction defense. Id. As explained by 
the Supreme Court, the district court's decision made no findings on the substance or merits of 
the conversion claim, yet the court declined to award fees on the basis that the defendant did not 
prevail on his conversion claim. Id at 1125. The Supreme Court aptly noted that the conversion 
claim never came into play because the defendant prevailed on his accord and satisfaction 
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While the Robertsons prevailed in escaping liability under the Employment Contracts, 
their success in the balance of this litigation is much more problematic. The Robertsons' 
attorneys expended substantial time and money obstinately pursuing claims and defenses that the 
Court had already summarily dismissed. Although the Court's Orders on the parties' Motions 
for Summary Judgment did not dispose ofthe case, KLC won several key issues as a matter of 
law. The remainder went to the jury. While the jury found that the Robertsons did not breach 
the Employment Contracts, it also rejected the Robertsons' two counterclaims that the money 
disbursed from the second buyer's deposits had been converted or that KLC had done anything 
to violate the ICP A. Because KLC was at least partially successful, it respectfully requests that 
the Court decline to award attorneys' fees and costs to the Robertsons. 
The Court must also acknowledge that, although the parties' competing claims grew out 
of the same years-long course of dealing, the suit that found its way to trial in June 2009 
contained separate claims by separate parties seeking separate relief. As originally framed, this 
lawsuit concerned only contractual claims brought by an Idaho corporation, KLC, against 
landowners, the Robertsons. The Robertsons denied liability and asserted a Counterclaim. 
However, Count One of the Counterclaim lumped a new Third Party Defendant, John Knipe, 
together with KLC, making open-ended allegations of undescribed, deceptive acts violating the 
prohibitions enumerated in Idaho Code § 48-603, without substantially distinguishing between 
them. 
defense, and therefore, the defendant could not have been deemed to have lost that claim. ld. In 
this case, the Robertsons' conversion claim was not pled in the alternative, and therefore, the jury 
specifically decided the issue in favor of Mr. Knipe. 
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Count Two of the Robertsons' Counterclaim was directed solely at John Knipe, claiming 
that he had "tortiously converted" the $22,000 that had been disbursed from the deposits paid by 
the second purchaser of the Robertsons' land before it backed out of its purchase contract. 
The jury decided that Mr. Knipe had violated the ICPA and awarded $1,000 in nominal 
damage as allowed by Idaho Code § 48-608. The jury was not asked, and it is therefore not 
certain exactly what Mr. Knipe was supposed to have done to violate the statute. However, the 
logical surmise is that the jury disapproved of Mr. Knipe's conduct in connection with Mr. 
Robertson's February 2008 agreement to extend the effective terms of both Employment 
Contracts. Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the jury's finding that no one 
wrongfully retained the $22,500 KLC received before the second purchaser terminated its land 
purchase contract with the Robertsons in January 2008. Looking only to Mr. Knipe's dealings 
with the Robertsons that occurred after January 2008 to find a violation of the ICPA is also 
consistent with Mr. Robertson's testimony that he was satisfied and pleased with KLC's work up 
to that time. 
The point of this analysis is to distinguish, as the Court must, between the claims the 
Robertsons disputed against their original adversary, KLC, and the separate statutory claims they 
mounted against John Knipe personally. Put another way, the breaches of contract that formed 
the essence of the controversy between KLC and the Robertsons were separate from the statutory 
claims they made against John Knipe for allegedly deceptive and unconscionable business 
practices that he undertook in his personal capacity. Where such separate claims are made 
against separate parties, a court should not "lump" a successful litigant's opponents together but 
must instead make a distinction as to whether each claim merits an award or not. See, e.g., 
Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, _, 191 P.3d 1107, 1115 (Ct. App. 2008). Where different 
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· parties to the same lawsuits succeed on separate claims, those claims should be analyzed 
separately to determine if attorneys fees are appropriate. Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 
Idaho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990). "Where parties have each prevailed on different 
causes of action tried in the same lawsuit, attorney fees may be apportioned accordingly." 
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111, 121,626 P.2d 767, 777 (1981). 
The Robertsons' ICPA claims against John Knipe, as an individual, were separate and 
distinct from those the asserted against KLC, and, indeed, that is just the way the jury decided 
the matter. Given that, and given the foregoing authorities, the Court must distinguish between 
the Robertsons' claims against KLC and those against John Knipe. Although they recovered a 
verdict against him, it was only $1,000, and that must be contrasted to the open-ended relief the 
Robertsons sought against him, personally, under the ICPA. Where there is a substantial 
disproportion between the amounts claimed in the pleadings and those recovered at trial, it is 
within the Court's discretion not to deem the party recovering such comparatively small sums a 
"prevailing party." Burns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 818 P.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Although Idaho Code § 48-608(5) states that the Court "shall" award "reasonable 
attorney's fees to the plaintiff if he prevails," the determination of whether such a plaintiff has, 
indeed, "prevail[ed]" remains subject to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B) and the foregoing law. 
Additionally, an award of fees under Idaho Code § 48-608(5) must be "reasonable," and 
reasonability must be determined in light of the considerations enumerated in Idaho R. Civ. P. 
54(e)(3). Applying these standards, it may be determined that the Robertsons were not 
"prevailing parties" insofar as their claims against John Knipe were concerned. They sought 
unspecified, open-ended damages from him under the ICPA and, if their Counterclaim is to be 
read literally, claimed that Mr. Knipe's personal actions rendered the Employment Contracts, on 
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which KLC's entire claim depended, void and unenforceable. For all of that, they recovered 
$1,000, undoubtedly for conduct that took place after the contractual rights of the parties had 
been fully determined, and which, as is more fully argued in KLC's Motion for New Trial or for 
JNOV, was factually and legally irrelevant to the case actually tried in June. 
The Robertsons have provided little help distinguishing how much of their legal fees 
were devoted to pursuing their ICP A claims against John Knipe as opposed to how much were 
devoted to defending against KLC's contractual claims. However, given the emphasis placed by 
the Robertsons at trial on John Knipe's personal conduct, it is reasonable to estimate that at least 
one-third of their fees were focused on this issue, and the Court will be well within its discretion 
to find that they were not "prevailing parties" on their ICP A claims against him, just as it will be 
well within its discretion to determine that the "reasonable" attorneys fees they are entitled to for 
that claim, if any, should be modest and in proportion to the $1,000 they obtained as their sole 
relief in that connection. 
B. The Robertson Have Overstated the Costs They Are Entitled to Recover as a Matter 
of Right. 
The costs a prevailing party is entitled to recover as a matter of right are enumerated in 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(C). In conformity therewith, the Robertsons are entitled to recover 
their filing fee ($71) and the represented cost of the depositions taken in this matter ($1,305.50). 
See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(C)(1), (9), (10). But the Robertsons also claim $98.55 for 
"[c]opying of exhibits 657 @ 0.15," "[c]opying of exhibits 570 @ 0.15 = $85.50," "$397.80 for 
"[ c ]opying 12 sets of 221 jury exhibits," and $31.79 for an "[ e ]asel and pad" (see Affidavit of 
Robert Wetherell ("Wetherell Aff.") at 3), almost none of which is allowed to a prevailing party 
as a matter ofright. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(C)(6) allows only the "[r]easonable costs of the 
preparation of ... exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits . .. ," to be awarded as a matter of 
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right. (Emphasis added.) At trial, only the Robertsons' Exhibits A, N, 0, Q, R, T, U, V, KK, 
MM, PP, QQ, RR, and IT were admitted in evidence. Those admitted exhibits amounted to 27 
pages of copied documents, which, at the Robertsons' claimed cost of $0.15 a page, comes to a 
total of $4.05. The remainder of costs claimed for copied "exhibits" must therefore be 
disallowed Similarly, the Robertsons' "easel and pad" was not admitted into evidence as an 
exhibit, so that claim should also be disallowed. 
In summary, the Robertsons may only claim their filing fee, deposition costs, and cost of 
preparing the documents actually admitted in evidence, as costs they are entitled to as a matter of 
right. These costs total $1,380.50. 
C. All of the Robertsons' Claimed Discretionary Costs Should Be Disallowed. 
The Robertsons have claimed discretionary costs consisting of copying (presumably 
including the copying charges they erroneously claimed as a matter of right, as discussed above), 
postage, mileage, and meals for their attorneys, and their cost of the mediation ordered by the 
Court, totaling $1,647.01. 
Discretionary costs may include copying costs and travel expenses, but on a showing by 
the claimant that such expenditures were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, 
and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
54(d)(1)(D). The Robertsons have made no effort to demonstrate that any of these costs was in 
the least bit "exceptional" and should, "in the interest of justice," be awarded to them. 
This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost 
be "exceptional" under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) to include those costs 
incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional. In 
Great Plains Equip., the Court specifically noted that discretionary 
costs, including those for expert witness fees, were "exceptional 
given the magnitude and nature of the case .... " Certain cases, 
such as personal injury, cases generally involve copy, travel and 
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expert witness fees and such that these costs are considered 
ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). 
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d 161, 168 (2005) (citations 
omitted). 
Travel between attorneys' offices in Boise and the courtroom in Payette hardly qualifies 
as an extraordinary circumstance, and the copying of documents for litigation purposes is even 
more routine. Presumably, attorneys have to eat no matter where they are trying a case, so those 
costs should be disallowed. Finally, rather than being something "exceptional," it is the 
consistent policy of the courts to encourage mediation as a vehicle for the settlement of litigation, 
so that claim should be disallowed, too. Idaho R. Civ. P. 16(a)(6). 
D. The Attorneys' Fees Sought by the Robertsons Are Unreasonable, Duplicative, and 
Excessive. 
If the Court awards attorneys fees and costs to the Robertsons notwithstanding the above 
argument, the amount sought by the Robertsons must be significantly reduced for the reasons set 
forth below. 
1. Legal Standard Guiding an Award of Attorneys Fees. 
"The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court." 
Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580,592,917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996). This amount may 
be more or less than the sum the prevailing party is obligated to pay its attorney. See Nalen v. 
Jenkins, 114 Idaho 973, 976, 763 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ct. App. 1988). What constitutes a 
"reasonable" fee is a discretionary determination for the trial court, to be guided by the criteria of 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3). Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999 
P .2d 914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000). "A court is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time 
and labor expended by the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the 
figures advanced by the attorney." Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704,706, 
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701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct. App. 1985). "Hence, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily 
and unreasonably incurred .... " Daisy MIg. Co., 134 Idaho at 263,999 P.2d at 918. 
2. The Attorneys' Fees Sought by the Robertsons Are Excessive and 
Unreasonable. 
a. The Billing Entries Obscure a Reasonability Analysis. 
The fee applicant should exercise good "billing jUdgment" when submitting an 
application for fees and "should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a 
reviewing court to identify distinct claims." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,437 (1983). 
The summary of fees and costs provided by counsel for the Robertsons contains several block-
billed entries, which fail to allocate what time was spent doing each task. By failing to properly 
itemize each task, counsel for the Robertsons obscured any attempt to evaluate whether the time 
dedicated to each task was reasonable. For example, there is a time entry for 3.8 hours ($760) 
for an associate, Bradley S. Richardson. (Wetherell Aff. Ex. A at 4.) The entry next to the 
charge reads: "Travel to trial to provide impeachment evidence reo John Knipe and trial support 
reo impeachment of Plaintiff s real estate agent." It appears from the entry that the associate 
charged for travel to Payette (which is nearly a one-hour drive from Boise and a one-hour drive 
back) but performed only 1.8 hours of legal services at the trial. There is no indication of exactly 
what those legal services consisted of-an oversight recommending their disallowance. 
Another example is a time entry by Mr. Wetherell on June 25 for 16.20 hours ($4,050) 
that reads: "Travel to Payette, attend trial, take verdict and return travel to Boise." ld. It is 
impossible to tell exactly what took 16.20 hours. Derek Pica, who accompanied Mr. Wetherell 
that day, billed 12.5 hours for travel and attend trial. (Affidavit of Derek Pica ("Pica Aff.") Ex. 
A, last page.) Moreover, the date in question was the last day at trial. As the Court will recall, 
trial started at 8:30 a.m. The jury returned its verdict around 6:00 p.m., after about two hours' 
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deliberation. Allowing two hours for travel to and from Payette, one comes up with 
approximately what Mr. Pica charged, but that leaves about four hours ofMr. Wetherell's time, 
or $1,000, unaccounted for. That additional charge should be disallowed. 
h. The Billing Summaries Reflect Duplicative Billing. 
The Court should further note that Mr. Richardson was the third attorney present and 
billing at trial on both June 25 and 26. This case is a conventional breach of contract case, and 
three attorneys (two of them having over 20 years of experience each) billing simultaneously 
were not necessary for trial. The unique aspects of this controversy were almost entirely legal 
and largely decided by the Court in the pre-trial Motions. Nevertheless, the fee summary reflects 
that Mr. Wetherell alone accrued thousands of dollars in legal fees on June 19 and 20, getting up 
to date on this case in the final hours before trial. (See Wetherell Aff. Ex. A.) As if that was not 
sufficient, a third attorney, Mr. Richardson, also accrued thousands of dollars merely reviewing 
and analyzing documents in the record and meeting with clients to review the facts. (Jd.) In this 
connection, one should also note that Mr. Richardson's billing rate is only $50 an hour less than 
his senior colleague's, even though Mr. Richardson graduated from law school in 2004, while 
Mr. Wetherell has nearly 26 years of experience.4 It is therefore appropriate that Mr. 
Richardson's hourly rate be reduced to $150. 
Finally, deciding to add two new attorneys to their trail team on the Friday before trial 
began was the Robertsons' decision. KLC should not be burdened with the cost of the 
inefficiencies inherent in having brand new counsel frantically familiarize themselves with topics 
that had been the subject of months oflitigation by the parties' original counsel. The Robertsons 
undoubtedly had their own reasons for indulging in this sudden expansion of their representation, 
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but that does not mean that all of the additional costs so incurred are reasonable, given the 
overall complexion of the case. It is therefore reasonable that the total award of fees claimed by 
the Robertsons should be reduced by at least 15% as an acknowledgement of the inefficiencies 
inherent in managing their case in such a chaotic manner. 
c. The Robertsons' Request for Paralegal Fees Is Excessive and 
Unreasonable. 
The Robertsons' petition for fees includes a request for paralegal services performed by 
Lorinda Tuttle at a rate of $140 per hour. The Robertsons provided no authority to support that 
this is a reasonable rate for her services. Although Mr. Wetherell's affidavit describes Ms. Tuttle 
as having years of experience, he fails to specify whether Ms. Tuttle received paralegal training. 
(Wetherell Aff. at 6.) In fact, Ms. Tuttle's rate is only $35 per hour less than that charged by Mr. 
Pica, the attorney who handled the majority of the case and who has over 20 years of experience 
as an attorney. (See Pica Aff. at 5.) Moreover, the tasks performed by Ms. Tuttle appear to be 
administrative in nature and do not justifY her rate. Specifically, Ms. Tuttle spent over 20 hours 
and accrued over $2,800 in legal fees for doing Internet research on individuals on the jury panel. 
(See Wetherell Aff. Ex. A. at 2,3,5.) KLC does not dispute the recovery of paralegal time 
where appropriate; however, clerical and administrative matters do not merit $140 per hour. 
3. The Court Should Deny the Robertsons' Request for Fees and Costs Related 
to Their Second Motion for Summary Judgment as Well as Their Motion to 
ReconsiderlMotion for Clarification, as the Motions Were Duplicative and 
Unnecessary. 
Despite a clear ruling from the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the Robertsons filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment as well as a Motion to 
Reconsider and/or Motion for Clarification. Despite the absence of any new evidence or any 
4 This information was derived from Mr. Wetherell's law firm's website. 
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previously-unavailable law, Mr. Pica incurred more fees in researching, drafting, and preparing 
for a hearing on a Motion to Clarify the first Summary Judgment and a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on authority that was easily accessible when the first Motion was 
submitted, but which was overlooked. Indeed, Mr. Pica's Summary of Fees and Costs reflects 
thousands of dollars dedicated to researching and drafting those motions-motions that should 
never have been filed with the Court. (See Pica Aff. Ex. A, entries between Mar. 6,2009, and 
May 15,2009.) It is worth repeating that in denying both the Robertsons' second Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Robertsons' Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Clarification, 
the Court explained "[t]here is no new evidence before the Court .... " Therefore, the 
Robertsons' Motions were brought without proper justification. 
Mr. Pica used a form of block-billing that makes it impossible to determine the exact 
amount of time dedicated to these two unnecessary motions. However, a reasonable estimate 
based on the entries is $8,200. This amount should be deducted from any award of fees to the 
Robertsons. 
4. To the Extent the Court Determines the Robertsons Were the Prevailing 
Parties in Connection with Their ICP A Claims against John Knipe, Their 
"Reasonable" Attorneys' Fees Should Be Limited and in Proportion to the 
Relief Obtained on Each Claim. 
As argued above, the Robertsons' ICPA claims against John Knipe were separate and 
distinct from the controversy between them and KLC. The former was based on purposely 
nebulous allegations of deceptive and unconscionable conduct by an individual, while the latter 
claims were firmly centered on the execution and performance of the two Employment 
Contracts. Consequently, the Court is obligated to evaluate this claim separately; to decide who, 
if anyone, prevailed in connection with each one; and to separately determine the reasonable 
amount of fees due in connection with each one. 
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The Robertsons' attorneys have provided only their billing sheets, which, by and large, 
make little distinction between their efforts to impugn John Knipe's integrity to show a violation 
of the ICP A, and the efforts that were clearly concerned with the Employment Contracts 
themselves. Nevertheless, of the factors to be considered under Rule 54(e)(3), it would appear 
that subsection G is most relevant: "[t]he amount involved and the results obtained." 
The Robertsons did not demonstrate any financial loss that they experienced as a result of 
any supposedly deceptive conduct by John Knipe. Ultimately, "the results obtained" against him 
consisted of $1,000. This nominal sum recommends, first, that the Court find that the substantial 
proportion oflegal fees that was undoubtedly devoted to attacking John Knipe be isolated from 
the balance of the fees claimed by the Robertsons, and, secondly, that what is a "reasonable" 
amount of those fees be determined strictly within the terms of the ICPA claims the Robertsons 
asserted against that individual. Given that the only relief obtained is $1,000, and that it 
apparently concerned conduct that had a merely tangential (if any) relationship to the 
controversy actually at bar, KLC and John Knipe first assert that the total amount of fees claimed 
be reduced by one-third (approximately $36,000), such being a reasonable allocation of the work 
devoted to the ICPA claims against John Knipe. Further, application of the factors set forth in 
Rule 54(e)(3) recommends that the fees that may then be awarded in connection the Robertson's 
claims under the ICPA should not exceed $5,000. 
E. Settlement Negotiations Have No Impact on an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
Rule 54( d)(1 )(B) provides that "[i]n determining which party to an action is a prevailing 
party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment 
or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." As specifically 
stated, the Rule contemplates the relief sought by the respective parties in their original 
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complaint, not settlement negotiations. See Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 754,86 P.3d 458, 
468 (2004) ("This Court has repeatedly held '[a] trial court's consideration of failed settlement 
negotiations, or of a refusal to negotiate a settlement, when deciding whether to award attorney 
fees is prohibited under Idaho law.'" (citation omitted; brackets in original»; Braley 
v. Pangburn, 118 Idaho 575, 583, 798 P.2d 34,42 (1990) ("[T]here is no authority in a trial court 
to insist upon, oversee, or second guess settlement negotiations, if any, and certainly no authority 
to impose sanctions for bad faith bargaining." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted»; 
see also Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 29,830 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1992).5 The Robertsons' 
citation to Lake v. Purnell, 143 Idaho 818,821, 153 P.3d 1164, 1167 (2007), is misplaced, since 
that opinion dealt with the demand requirement specifically imposed by Idaho Code § 12-120(4) 
with respect to personal injury claims for less than $25,000. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Robertsons should be prevented from recovering any attorneys fees or costs incurred 
in this litigation, as both parties were partially successful. Furthermore, they are entitled to 
recover only about one-third of the cost their claim, both as a matter of right and as a matter of 
the Court's discretion. In any event, the determination of whether they were prevailing parties in 
their claims against KLC must be separated from the determination that must be made with 
respect to their ICPA claims against John Knipe as an individual. However, even if the Court 
elects to award the Robertsons attorneys' fees and costs in this action, the amounts requested by 
the Robertsons in connection with the two disparate claims that were given to the jury must be 
5 The unwarranted emphasis placed by the Robertsons on settlement negotiations 
nevertheless compels KLC and John Knipe to inform the Court that, rather than adopting the 
conciliatory pose asserted in their brief, the Robertsons demanded that KLC pay them $100,000 
to settle just before trial began. 
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reduced significantly for the above-stated reasons. KLC and John Knipe therefore respectfully 
request that this Court deny the Robertsons' Motion, or, in the alternative, significantly reduce 
the amounts sought by the Robertsons. 
DATED: July £1,2009. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
MafkS:Geston 
Jennifer M. Reinhardt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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